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ON THE CONCEPTS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
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Two particular concepts emerged which should present legal grounds for new ap-
proaches of the superpowers. These are: 1) the concept of humanitarian interven-
tion and 2) a new approach to self-defence, as an exception to the prohibition of 
the use of force. 
Such concepts cannot be accepted particularly because they oppose to the basic 
principles of contemporary international law.
How can we react then to severe human sufferings, i.e. in situations where peace 
and security are at stake? Well, it is understood – through the United Nations! They 
are created for it.  Until other solutions emerge (for instance, for the transformation 
of the international community into a superstate), reactions can only be multilateral 
– through the Security Council. Even then the solution should be sought primarily 
in the non-military measures, and especially in the collective states` actions.
Keywords: use of force, humanitarian intervention, preventive self defence (use of 
force), effective international law, UN Security Council 
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary international law is based on the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles founded upon it. Although they were originally contractual 
in nature, these principles became part of general international customary law, 
hence binding to all. Special significance is given to the principle of peaceful 
resolution of international disputes and the principle regarding the prohibition of 
threat and use of force. These are, among others, comprised within Art. 2/3-4 of 
the UN Charter.  
In fact, the historical contribution of the UN Charter is comprised in the pro-
hibition of the use of force itself.  Even if, in earlier days, the international legal 
order allowed states to resort to force (jus ad bellum) under certain conditions and 
for the protection of their own interests, that right was revoked after World War 
II. What is more, the threat of force itself was prohibited1. Delivered at the mo-
1 As a reminder, according to the UN Charter, the use of force  has been  permitted only in two 
cases – either in the event of individual or collective self-defence from the armed assault (Art. 
51 of the UN Charter) or in the event of measures undertaken by the UN based on section VII 
* The author’s viewpoints are not shared by the Adrias editorial board.
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ment of the general social sobriety – on the foundations of the fresh wounds left 
by WWII and on the memories of WWI2 atrocities - the prohibition of threat and 
use of force was a great accomplishment for all of mankind. 
Although force was placed beyond the law in that way, practice demonstrated 
that the states (at least some of them) were not prepared to renounce force as one 
of the instruments of their foreign policy. Wars occurred even after 1945, and the 
UN, paralysed by the discord between its most important member states, was 
often unable to prevent or restrain them. 
Various conflicts taking place in that period were deemed as a crude and trag-
ic inevitability, as an integral part of the “cold war”. All in all, an incomparably 
lesser evil in relation to the possible open conflict between different parts of the 
divided world. The main task was to avoid a new world war. In the light of that, 
the two superpowers, generally speaking, tolerated certain actions of the opposite 
side (truth be told, providing its opponents with weapons), and they did also not 
demonstrate a complete determination to restrain conflicts between the minor 
third states, because they tended to use those events for their political purposes. 
That happened during the “Cold War”. However, the war ended and the world 
hoped that the times of discord were over, and that common interests, understand-
ing and co-operation would prevail eventually. Unfortunately, these expectations 
were soon failed.
 Among other things, the superpowers were not ready to give up the use of 
weapons when it suited their interests. Quite the contrary. However, in these new 
conditions, in the situation when the “Iron Curtain” and the enemies behind it no 
longer existed, more than ever there occurred the need to present the world and their 
own public with more or less acceptable argumentation for military expeditions out-
side their own borders.3 In other words, either the use of force was to be abolished 
(and they were obviously not ready to do so) or a way had to be found to subsume 
such actions under what is acceptable under contemporary international law.4
of the Charter for the maintenance and the establishment of international peace and security. 
As a third and final exception to the prohibition of threat and use of force, the UN Charter (Art. 
53, 107) provides for the coercive measures against former enemy states (states that were en-
emies with any of the signatory states of the Charter during WWII), however those regulations 
were long abandoned. 
2 It is necessary to remind ourselves that the Charter begins with the following words: «We, the 
peoples of the United Nations, determined to save future generations from the scourge of war, 
which has, twice in our lifetime, brought untold sorrow to mankind...».
3 In the Cold War era these questions were not asked, or at least not in that manner. Many things 
could have been justified by the use of coercive measures for the protection from «the Com-
munist menace» or «the Western Imperialism». Actually, «restoration of order» in its interest 
sphere (for instance, interventions for the preservation of status quo) is deemed as an aspect of 
self-defence (from actual or imaginary assaults of the opposing party).
4 We must agree with those who notice that: «with the end of the Cold War the argument of 
interventionism most used by the USA vanished into thin air. Nobody believes anymore that 
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In that sense, two particular concepts emerged which should present legal 
grounds for new approaches of the superpowers. These are: 1) the concept of 
humanitarian intervention and 2) a new approach to self-defence, as an exception 
to the prohibition of the use of force. 
II. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
1. Concept
The possibility of collective action for humanitarian reasons, the so-called 
«intervention of humanity» (intervention d’ humanité), is connected primarily to 
the 19th century and the military actions of the European powers, the members of 
the so-called Saint Alliance, against Turkey, justified by the necessity to prevent 
the suffering of the Christian peoples in the Balkans.
In the 20th century, in conformity with the principle of non-intervention, this 
practice was widely abandoned. Still, even after the UN Charter prohibited the 
use of force, there were at least dozen examples of the use of force under the 
pretence of humanitarianism. However, those were isolated cases real motives 
of which were of a different nature. Therefore these actions were either highly 
condemned or were not supported by the wider international community. 
When the bloc division disappeared, expectations of a better, more just and 
more democratic world emerged. In such a climate, certain authors and politicians, 
as well as non-governmental organisations5 started to advocate more openly the 
idea that a classic concept of state sovereignty was overcome, and that, in cases 
where the citizens of a certain country were made victims of a serious breach 
of human rights by their governments, intervention by an international factor or 
even by a certain state is allowed, even through military actions. The term “new 
interventionism” was coined. This question was addressed by everyone, each 
from their own perspective: legal authors, politicians, diplomats, philosophers, 
activists of numerous mentioned non-governmental organisations etc.6
Discussion on permission, and even the necessity of humanitarian interven-
Washington has to send marines or overthrow governments in order to fight the Soviet expan-
sionism. According to that, the creators of the USA politics needed new justifications for their 
interventionist policy, which was always led by the less noble motives». See: Shalom S.R.: 
Protecting Americans Abroad: Pretext for Intervention, p. 1. www.zmag.org/ZMag/articles/
Shalominterven.html. 
5 There is, for instance, the Human Rights Watch, which advocates the recourse to so-called hu-
manitarian interventions under certain conditions. More about it in Roth K.: War in Iraq: Not a 
Humanitarian Intervention, Human Rights Watch World Report 2004, http://hrw.org/wr2k4/3.
html. 
6 For this sake this paper will not address only the referential works of the legal science, but also 
the wider spectrum of sources.
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tion reached the UN as well. What is more, it was advocated on many occasions 
by the highest officials of the Organisation, among which by the UN Secretary 
General at the time, Kofi Annan.7
Among other matters, the doctrine “Responsibility to Protect” was launched8. 
Namely, as a response to the requests of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 
the government of Canada together with a group of large foundations established 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty9 which de-
livered a report in 2001 named “Responsibility to Protect”.10 It formulated a new 
doctrine basic meaning of which amounts to the attitude that the sovereign states 
are obligated to protect their own citizens from the unavoidable catastrophes – 
mass murders, rapes, hunger – but if they are unable or unwilling to do so, the 
responsibility should be given to a wider community of states. This «responsibil-
ity» implies three concrete responsibilities: to prevent, to react and to ensure.11
The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan established his Commission in 2002 
– “a group of wise men” at a high level who published their own report in 200412 
and who advocate the possibility of intervention under certain conditions, even a 
forceful one, for humanitarian reasons.
But, what exactly is implied under humanitarian intervention? Even though it 
is widely discussed, there is no general definition. In fact, it could be argued that 
there are as many definitions as there are authors. Differences are great particular-
ly because of the fact that those who give their own definitions often simultane-
ously tend to provide conditions under which (in their opinion) such intervention 
would be allowed.  
To comprehend it better, we will expose, in a simple manner, the basic ele-
7 Kofi Annan stated on 9 September 1999, among other things, that the sovereignty of  states 
can be overpowered by humanitarian intervention in the event of extensive breach of human 
rights. He invited the members of the United Nations to unite for the creation of a more effi-
cient policy – up to the use of armed forces – in order to terminate the mass murders and crying 
breaches of human rights.
8 See: Secretary-General’s Address to mark International Human Rights Day (8.12.2006), 
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/printsgstats.asp?nid=2351#, p. 1; Котляр В.С.: Концепция 
отвественности за защиту как проект кодекса проведения гуманитарных интервенций), 
Международное публичное и частное право,  3/2005, http://www.spbpravo.ru/comm.
php?id=776. 
9 This body is also known as the Evans-Sahnoun Commission (after the surnames of its co-
presidents: Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun).
10 The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, December 2001, 91 pp. http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf.
11 The Responsibility to Protect:  op. cit.,  p. VIII. 
12  A more secure world: Our shared responsibility,  Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN doc. A/59/565 (2004),  http://www.un.org/
secureworld/report.pdf.
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ments most often indispensable for a humanitarian intervention to occur. We are 
talking, therefore, about situations which differentiate it from some other similar 
phenomena.13
1. Character of the action. – Although in principle humanitarian intervention 
could be understood in a wider sense, as any intervention, even through non-vi-
olent means, today we mostly perceive under that name such a measure which is 
undertaken through armed force. Some tend to subsume the threat of force under 
humanitarian intervention, for humanitarian reasons. In any case, it is generally 
considered that a peaceful intervention, for instance through peaceful protests, 
diplomatic notes etc. is not comprised within this concept.
 2. Reasons. – Although the mere name of these concepts reveals the fact that 
the intervention for humanitarian reasons is at issue, there is no general consensus 
what the concept stands for – what concrete, necessary and substantial reasons are 
required to take these measures into consideration in the first place. The most of-
ten requirement is that a certain state has a massive breach of basic human rights 
(especially mass murders and genocide), i.e. that there is a substantial breach of 
international humanitarian law. However, while there is talk of saving human 
lives on the one hand, on the other hand reasons for intervention are understood 
much more liberally, to the extent that the intervention should be resorted to in the 
event of other substantial breaches of human rights as well. Also, while one group 
of people thinks that an intervention is justifiable for the sake of terminating the 
breach of human rights and humanitarian law, others do not refrain from saying 
that it should be resorted to for the sake of preventing such a breach (therefore, 
even before the breach occurs). According to that, even though at first sight it may 
appear that among the supporters of the humanitarian intervention doctrine there 
is a consensus on this issue, in fact there are some serious differences which may 
appear to be (if this doctrine were accepted) of great practical significance, with 
substantially different consequences. 14
13  Cfr: Kolb R.: Note on humanitarian intervention, Affaires courantes et commentaires - Cur-
rent issues and comments, http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng=.nff/htmlall/5LPKFQ/$File/
irrc_849_kolb.pdf, pp. 119-121; Grimstad K.: Humanitarian Intervention, Historical, Legal 
and Moral Perspectives, http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/pbl/grimstad.pdf, pp. 4-6.
14  Cfr: Paunović M.: “Humanitarna intervencija” kao zloupotreba načela zabrane upotrebe sile u 
međunarodnom pravu (“Humanitarian intervention” as the abuse of the prohibition of the use 
of force principle in international law),  Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo 1-3/1999, 
p. 149; Федоров А.: Гуманитарная интервенция – новая тенденция в современном мире, 
Contemporary Issues 1999,  http://newsletter.iatp.by/ctr2-7.htm, p. 1; Simons C.P.: Humani-
tarian Intervention: A Review of Literature, http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/WORK-
ING%20PAPERS/wp012.html, p. 2; Grimstad K.: op. cit., p. 2; Kolb R.: op. cit., p. 119; Corell 
H. (Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, The Legal Counsel of the UN): To intervene 
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3. No approval of the respective state. -  In some parts of literature there is an 
emphasis that humanitarian intervention is at issue only when there is no consent 
of the state being intervened. If it gave its consent, there is no need for the concept 
of humanitarian intervention. 
Actually, if intervention occurred at the invitation or consent of the state at 
issue, it is rather the question of some form of military or similar co-operation 
or aid, than of the classic concept of intervention. The other thing is that interna-
tional practice is familiar with too many examples where intervention occurred at 
the invitation of the puppet or anti-people regime – not for humanitarian reasons, 
but for the preservation of government, for the preservation of a certain country’s 
affiliation to a particular sphere of interest etc.
 4. The UN mandate. – There are great differences of opinion on the issue 
whether humanitarian intervention can be undertaken solely on the grounds of the 
mandate given by the UN Security Council or if it is, under certain conditions, 
legal even without it. 
There is no doubt that a certain part of the international community thinks 
that in particular cases the Security Council, driven by humanitarian reasons, 
is entitled to undertake or order military action in a certain country. With such 
an approach, the Security Council decision is considered not only a necessary 
precondition for legally permissible interventions but also one of its fundamental 
elements which distinguish it from similar phenomena. Many people think that 
only an intervention like that would be legitimate, therefore they limit this term 
to such actions.   
Others, however, see humanitarian intervention as any military action against 
another state, undertaken for humanitarian reasons. Hence, even such an action 
undertaken with or without the obtained UN mandate15. Finally, there is the third 
view of humanitarian intervention - it is considered to be only that military ac-
tion undertaken by a state or a group of states without the mandate given by a 
competent international organisation or one of its bodies – primarily (though not 
exclusively) by the UN Security Council.  It is explained by the fact that when 
or not: The dilemma that will not go away, Conference on the Future of Human Interven-
tioni, Durham, 2001, p. 2, http://www.un.org/law/counsel/english/duke01.pdf; Holzgrefe J.: 
The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in: Holzgrefe J., Keohane R. (eds.): Humanitarian In-
tervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 18; 
Иноземцев В.: Гуманитарные интервенции: Понятие, задачи, методы осуществления, 
Космополис, 1/2005, http://www.polit.ru/research/2005/04/29/intervenstia.html, стр. 5; Bello 
W.: Humanitarian Intervention – Evolution of Dangerous Doctrine, Znet, www.zmag.org/con-
tent/showarticle.cfm? Item ID=9592, p. 1.
15 See for instance: Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects, Danish Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, Copenhagen, 1999, p. 11; http://www.dupi.dk/www.dupi.dk/htdocs/en11240.ssi.
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there is the permission of the Security Council, the intervening states have legal 
grounds for their action; hence there is no reason to call upon the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention16. A special term is introduced for the intervention un-
dertaken without the permission of the UN Security Council – they are referred 
to as unilateral. 
5. Impartiality. -  It can often be heard that humanitarian intervention is only 
the use of force undertaken for the protection of foreign citizens (and not the citi-
zens of the intervening state), which puts an emphasis on some kind of impartial-
ity (objectivity) of these measures17.
In connection with that, some sources underline that it should be taken into 
account that humanitarian intervention is to be distinguished from a violent ac-
tion undertaken by the state for the protection of its own citizens abroad. A typical 
example is a situation where the citizens of the respective state are held hostages 
abroad, and the local government (the territorial state) is not prepared or not able 
to act. In such cases the intervening state does so in favour of its citizens, so that 
there is a close connection between the state and the persons it wants to protect. 
In the event of humanitarian intervention, however, a state or a group of states 
always intervenes in favour of the foreign citizens, because of the alleged brutali-
ties that were committed and continue to appal the human conscience.    
A number of authors, however, do not distinguish these two cases, and do not 
set these prerequisites, i.e. in their opinion the term humanitarian intervention 
implies military action for the purposes of protecting the “endangered popula-
tion” (with no note on citizenship), i.e. for the sake of “saving lives of a certain 
group of people” “whether they are foreign or local citizens”.18
2.  Reasons in favour of permissibility and preconditions for the justification of 
humanitarian intervention
1. Advocates of the permissibility of a violent action for the protection of 
basic human rights in a foreign state refer to various arguments. We will mention 
here the most common ones.
First and foremost it is mentioned that, in the century we have just entered, the 
international community must not be indifferent towards violent and especially 
mass breaches of human rights, particularly when it comes to such phenomena as 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, massacres etc. Furthermore, it is mentioned that great 
human sufferings and bloodsheds cannot be tolerated anymore wherever they 
16 Cfr: Simons C.P.: op. cit.,  p. 2; Grimstad K.: op. cit., p. 2; Kolb R.:  op. cit.,  p. 119.
17 Cfr: Kolb R.: op. cit., p. 119; Holzgrefe J.: op. cit.,  p. 18.
18 Cfr: Kegli  Č.V. Jr., Vitkof J.R.: Svetska politika - trend i transformacija, Beograd 2004, p. 388; 
Paunović M.: op. cit., p. 149.
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may occur, even if within a certain society. In that context, it is often mentioned 
that new genocides and atrocities like the ones in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur 
etc. must never again be allowed.  
Furthermore, it is emphasised that the contemporary international law is 
based on the abandoned principles residing in the logic that the state is the basis 
of everything. However, in these times of universal globalisation, the sovereignty 
of states, which is starting to recede more and more anyway, ceases to be the ab-
solute value.19 It is noted that the state, sovereignty of which basically resides in 
the summary rights of its citizens, is obligated to protect them. If it is not capable 
of attending to its obligations, the government loses its sovereign power. In con-
nection with that, it is emphasised that many contemporary states are unable to 
guarantee basic human rights to people under their jurisdiction and some states 
even explicitly infringe them, which might have been tolerated once, but not in 
our time. Consequently, we come to the attitude that under certain conditions, 
state’s main imperative (protection of its citizens’ rights from foreign influences) 
gives way to universal human values (protection of personality against breaches 
of fundamental rights). 20
Even among the UN high-ranking officials21 it can be heard that the state’s 
sovereignty cannot be interpreted like it was in the past, and that today the states 
are considered to be the institutions which need to be of service to citizens, and 
not vice versa.22 Among other things, the UN Secretary General of the time, Kofi 
Annan, pointed out that in the nineties of the past century internal wars prevailed, 
which did not erase borders as much as they destroyed people – they led to the 
killing of 5 million people. In his opinion the creation of a new concept of security 
is in motion after all those conflicts. If earlier security amounted to the protection 
of a territory from foreign attacks, today it includes the protection of all of man-
kind and actual people from interstate violence. In addition to that, sometimes 
the states themselves execute violence towards their own citizens which they are 
obligated to protect under humanitarian law. 23
19 On these issues see, among others: Jackson J.H.: Sovereignty – Modern: A new Approach to an 
Outdated Concept, American Journal of International Law,  4/2003, pp. 782-802; Bartelson J.: The 
Concept of Sovereignty Revisited,  European Journal of International Law,  2/2006, pp. 463-474.
20 Hoffman S.: The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention, Survival,  4/1996, p. 35; cited 
according to: Бордачев Т.: Проблемы безопасности, Московский центр Карнеги, том 3, 
1998, стр.  4, http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/print/55703-print.htm.
21 See Annan K.: Two concepts of sovereignty, The Economist, 18.9.1999, http://www.un.org/
News/ossg/sg/stories/printarticle.asp?TID=Type=Article#. See also the text of H. Corell, As-
sistant of the UN  General Secretary for legal issues - Corell H.:  op. cit.,  p. 3.
22 In this matter the Westfall Treaty of 1648 is usually referred to, although this concept was 
introduced by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555.
23 Annan K.: We the Peoples: the Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, IV. Freedom 
from fear, par. 193-194, 210,  http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm.
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In favour of the concept of humanitarian intervention it is to be taken into ac-
count that intervention is a tool used for fighting the world chaos, since internal 
conflicts and violence are prone to spilling over borders together with the sea 
of refugees, and the neighbouring states can be directly drawn into the internal 
conflicts.24
Since it is obvious that this concept has no foothold in contemporary interna-
tional law, efforts have been made to create it. 
In this sense, attempts have been made to reread and reinterpret the UN Char-
ter.  In that respect, it is considered that the regulations of the Charter regarding 
the prohibition of threat and use of force must be interpreted in connection with 
other regulations of the Charter, especially with those concerning the protection 
of fundamental human rights, as well as with those concerning the measures 
available to the Security Council for the maintenance or establishment of peace 
and security.25
Besides that, attempts have been made to demonstrate that the regulation from 
Art. 2/4 of the Charter determining the obligation of the member states to refrain 
from “threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state”, leaves an open possibility for the use of force in other situations 
(among other things, for the protection of human rights). Such interventions are 
legal according to those authors, because their objective is not a violation of “ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of the states”26.
The efforts of the UN Secretary General’s Assistant for legal issues, Hans 
Corell, are interesting for many reasons. After he concludes that, for various rea-
sons, other methods of ensuring this concept of legal grounds are not possible;27 
he suggests that the institution of necessity be used. In his view, humanitarian 
intervention should be treated in the same way as necessity is in internal legal 
orders. Naturally, necessity is not codified, but its nature is such that it can be 
identified when it occurs. In his opinion, relevant issues should be considered 
from that perspective by the Security Council.28
In addition to that, it is indicated that no novelty has been discovered, since 
the acts of humanitarian intervention were often used in the past, especially in the 
19th century.29 Some authors even claim that the right to humanitarian interven-
24 Hoffman S.:  op. cit.,  p. 35.
25 Corell H.:  op. cit.,  pp. 3-4.
26 On the mentioned attitudes about the right to humanitarian intervention see: Bull H. (ed.): 
Intervention in the World Politics, 1984, ch. 7.
27 He presents his view on why this issue cannot be resolved by modifications of the UN Charter, 
codifications outside the Charter, recourse to the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, solutions 
through mediation of regional organisations.
28 Corell H.:  op. cit.  pp. 5-8. 
29 In favour of this attitude he refers to the well-known examples such as interventions of: France 
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tion at that time was some kind of customary law. In connection with that, there 
has been a direct allusion to the fact that such a custom has perhaps been revived 
even today.  As confirmation of that, it is mentioned that after 1945 and the adop-
tion of the UN Charter, there were about ten cases of the use of force for “humani-
tarian” reasons, and without the mandate granted by the Security Council; and it 
consequently appears that they were deemed permissible or at least not strongly 
opposed by the international community.
Finally, there are even some paradoxical ideas that the legalisation of the 
concept of humanitarian intervention should reduce the number of conflicts by 
discouraging wars fought for other motives.30
2. Even those who vigorously advocate the idea that it is essential to rec-
ognise the right of humanitarian intervention (some even talk about the duty to 
intervene) notice that some strict limitations must be introduced in order to avoid 
potential abuse of that right; particularly because “the privilege of the strong” (of 
powerful states) is at issue.
Many situations are listed here as conditions under which humanitarian in-
tervention should be allowed, and these are again, interpreted differently by dif-
ferent people. Although it is rather difficult to generalise, it is to be noted with 
reserve that it is basically required:31
- that a severe breach of fundamental rights in a given country is established; 
a breach of large proportions threatening the substantial loss of human 
lives; 
-  that a serious threat is established  justifying military intervention (i.e. that 
there are no other alternatives to save endangered human lives); 
and Great Britain in Greece (1827), Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia in Syria 
(1860): European forces against Turkey in Crete (1866), in Bosnia (1875), Bulgaria (1877) and 
Macedonia (1887); USA in Cuba (1898) etc.
30 Goodman R.: Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 1/2006, pp. 107-141. Also available at: www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/
pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf. See particularly: pp. 2, 5, 11-
12, 36, 42-43.
31 Cfr. For instance: Cassese A.: International Law, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 315-316; 
Cassese A.: Ex iniuria ius oritur. Are We Mowing towards International Legitimation of Forci-
ble Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, European Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 1/1999, pp. 23-30, http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/No1/com.html; The Respon-
sibility to Protect: op. cit.,  pp. 31-37; A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, op. cit., 
pars. 203-208, pp. 57-58; Duke S.: The State and Human Rights: Sovereignty versus Humani-
tarian Intervention, International Relations 2/1994, pp. 30-32, 43-44; Charney J.I.: Anticipa-
tory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, American Journal of International Law 4/1999, pp. 
838-839; Simons C.P.: op. cit.,  pp. 15-23; Roth K.: op. cit., pp. 2-10; Shalom S.R.: op. cit., p. 
2; Coady C.A.J.: The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, Peaceworks, United States 
Institute of Peace, 2002, pp. 24-31, http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks45.html.
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-  that there is a clear objective (to terminate the severe breach of human 
rights); 
-  that military intervention is used as a last resort (when all other i.e. peace-
keeping and non-violent means have been already exhausted, and there is a 
need for emergency action); 
-  that there is a ratio between the (forceful) means used and objectives (so 
that the duration and the intensity of the military action be at a reasonable 
level and not in excess); 
-  that there is a proportion between objectives and consequences (i.e. it is 
necessary to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility to use mili-
tary intervention to improve the situation and not exacerbate it); 
-  that the intervention is collective (executed by many and not just one 
state); 
-  that the intervention is executed at the right moment (at the moment of 
severe breach of human rights and not later – just in order to punish the 
responsible ones); 
-  that the intervener provides reliable evidence that what he does is in the 
interest of humanitarian issues (and not for selfish reasons); etc. 
Certain authors and politicians list some other requirements which are some-
times mutually exclusive. Thus, for instance, a part of them requires it to be a 
venture undertaken on the grounds of the decision (order or consent) of the UN 
Security Council or other competent international body as a precondition for the 
legality of humanitarian intervention. Their opponents mean by humanitarian in-
tervention only the appropriate actions undertaken without the mandate of the 
Security Council.
Common to the majority of authors is the insistence that the criteria upon 
which humanitarian intervention is based, whichever they may be should apply 
equally to all states, and not only to developing countries. In other words, one 
of the preconditions is that this practice be consistently applied to all states, ir-
respective of their size and power.   
3. Review
Does contemporary international law permit the undertaking of violent ac-
tions marked as humanitarian intervention? If it does not, should it be changed 
in any way? In other words, to what extent (if any) are the arguments of those 
advocating this concept justifiable? We will attempt to give brief review of some 
most important aspects.
We will deal here only with the so-called unilateral interventions, i.e. those 
undertaken by a certain state or a group of states on its own initiative, without the 
mandate from the UN Security Council. We will address the issue of permissibil-
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ity of humanitarian intervention on the grounds of the Security Council decision 
later on. 
1) Legal permissibility
The answer to the first question (whether humanitarian intervention is in con-
formity with the effective international law) should by all means be negative.32 
Even though humanitarian intervention is mentioned in some parts of the lit-
erature and in some political documents, it is not recognised by contemporary 
international law. 
In addition to that, it is not provided for in the UN Charter as one of excep-
tions to the general prohibition of the use of force.  
There should not be anything disputable. Art. 2/4 of the UN Charter can be 
interpreted only as the complete prohibition of the use of force.33 In addition to 
that, that interpretation can be found in many documents of the UN General As-
sembly, such as the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Do-
mestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereign-
ty (1965),34 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations (1970), Definition of Aggression (Resolution 3313/1974), Decla-
ration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (1982) etc.
According to that, each “unilateral” humanitarian intervention is prohibited 
by contemporary international law. In the light of that, all attempts to forcefully 
implement that concept in the framework set by the contemporary international 
law are bound to fail in advance.
In connection with that, the aforementioned new interpretations of the UN 
Charter according to which the obligation to prohibit the use of force applies 
only to such measures by which territorial integrity and states` sovereignty are 
violated, must be deemed at least as highly arbitrary. This is because in Art. 2/4 
32 Cfr: Shaw M.N.: International Law, Cambridge University Press 2003, pp. 1045-1046; Henkin 
L., Pugh R.C., Schachter O., Smit H.: International Law – Cases and Materials, St. Paul, Minn, 
1993, pp. 931-934.
33 Just to be reminded, it states that “In their international relations, all members refrain from 
threat and use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each state, 
or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”
34 This document adopted by the UN General Assembly with 109 votes “in favour” and just 1 
abstained (Great Britain), already in the provision 1 states that: “No State has the right to inter-
vene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any 
other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted 
threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural enti-
ties, are condemned.”
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of the Charter it is stated in the same tone  “or in any other manner incosistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations”. Since the most important purpose of 
the United Nations (Art. 1 of the Charter) is  “to maintain international peace and 
security”, it is logical that every breach of the international law is automatically 
opposed to UN objectives.35 
The idea of permissibility of humanitarian intervention cannot be defended 
even by the claim that such international legal custom exists. This is true for 
many reasons. Firstly, even if it once existed, such custom no longer exists. Obvi-
ously, for a reason. 
However, it all points to the fact that the so-call right of intervention for human-
itarian reasons did not exist even in the past as an international legal custom. There 
were certainly some actions which were disguised in such a manner, but it is dif-
ficult to talk about the “general practice” (usus) even with all the will in the world. 
This is particularly so because interventions were undertaken only by certain great 
powers and against weaker states. Moreover, it would be virtually impossible to 
prove the other, psychological element (opinio juris sive necessitatis), indispens-
able for the creation and existence of every international legal custom, including 
this one. Humanitarian interventions against Turkey and some other countries had 
grounds not only in international legal customs, but in the international treaties by 
which such resolutions were forced upon those states as well.36 
In addition to that, general circumstances were basically different than now. 
International law of the time did not clearly define the concept of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms and how to determine when they are severely vio-
lated. Therefore the decision on humanitarian intervention could not reside in the 
established norms and principles, but it depended on the current understandings, 
moods and balance of forces. It is more important that, at the time, the states` 
right to go to war was acknowledged as a legal means for the protection of rel-
evant interests. States were free to go to war at their own discretion, for reasons 
they deemed justified. They did not require any international legal custom on 
the right of humanitarian intervention for that. Hence it could be said at best that 
humanitarian interventions were never, not even in the 18th and 19th century, 
generally accepted, but just that they were not prohibited by the international law 
of the time.
But even if an international legal custom existed earlier regarding the right to 
a so-called humanitarian intervention, it would not be effective today because it 
would oppose basic regulations of the UN Charter and the most important prin-
35  Akehurst M.: A Modern Introduction to International Law, London 1984, pp. 219-220.
36 France was, for instance, delegated the right of protection of Catholics (religious minority) in 
1740 in Turkey, and later on the same right was awarded to Austria as well. On the other hand, 
the protection of the Eastern Orthodox Christians in Turkey (in the Balkans) was assumed by 
Russia, based on the peace treaties in  Kuchuk-Kainarji (1774) and  Adrianople (1829).
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ciples of  contemporary international law on the prohibition of the threat and use 
of force, hence with the jus cogens norms. In this matter, it would not be easy to 
prove usus, let alone opinio juris today. In any case, even those advocating the 
legalisation of the concept of humanitarian intervention, admit that since 2000 
(hence in recent times) at least 133 states (with about 80% of the world popula-
tion) rejected the idea of unilateral humanitarian intervention by either individual 
or collective acts.37
Furthermore, quite the opposite international legal custom is currently in 
force – on the prohibition of intervention. Even the International Court of Justice 
concluded that (especially in the case of Nicaragua vs. USA, 1986) international 
customary law does not allow for unilateral humanitarian interventions, and that, 
on the contrary, “the principle of non-intervention derives  from customary inter-
national law.”38 Therefore, no dilemmas should exist on that subject.
Finally, it is to be noted that even the attempts to legalise the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes with reference to the institution of necessity are futile. 
Even though there are other arguments, it is sufficient to notice in that sense that 
the right of necessity, which is essentially a general legal principle, cannot be 
grounds for the breach of norm on prohibition of the use of force, which is not 
just a jus cogens norm, but one of basic principles (hence foundations) of con-
temporary international law.
According to what was said here, military intervention without the mandate 
from the UN Security Council is forbidden under contemporary international law. 
It not only contradicts the principle of the prohibition of the use of force, but it 
also opposes many other important principles of contemporary international law, 
such as: pacta sunt servanda principle (the extent to which the UN Charter and 
other relevant treaties are violated), the principle of states` sovereignty and the 
principle of non-intervention in international relations. 
2) Matters of principle
In order not to be accused of strict formalism, we will attempt to observe the 
whole issue from different aspects. Hence, even if we abandon entirely the legal 
domain (even though: “dura lex, sed lex”), there is a whole set of other objec-
tions principled in nature. 
37 Goodman R.: op. cit.,  p. 3, footnote 7; p. 7.
38 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States), Judment of 27 June 1986, pp. 133-135, par. 246, p. 126, http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/70/6503.pdf.
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First of all, it is to be noted with reason that whenever there is a conflict be-
tween peace as the greatest world value and some other values, among which are 
human rights, the advantage should always be given to peace. However imperfect 
peace may be, war is always a worse alternative. It opens the Pandora box releas-
ing various evils which usually cannot be observed at first.   
It has already been emphasised that not even the advocates of humanitarian 
intervention can agree on its definition, or on its context and the elements it is 
composed of. Thus, logically, not even on the conditions under which it could be 
permitted. Somebody could argue that this is not the reason to abandon the idea 
itself, but on the contrary it is necessary to increase the efforts to reach general 
consensus on these issues. However, such an attitude would be unrealistic. There 
is a whole set of phenomena on which the deciding parties cannot or would not 
agree – there is for instance the definition of ethnic minorities, terrorists etc.39
The so-called unilateral humanitarian intervention is one of those phenomena. 
Even if it were to be recognized as legal, it would be difficult to reach consensus 
on its elements and conditions under which it can be resorted to, and especially 
on the issue whether those conditions are fulfilled in the specific case. In other 
words, there is always an actual risk that everyone would comprehend these is-
sues the way it suits them, hence arbitrarily.
Because of that, even if it should be legally permitted, the concept of humani-
tarian intervention would not only lead to legal uncertainty, legalisation of the use 
of force, it would also represent an inexhaustible source of various abuses. What 
would in that case prevent the use of force of one state against the other? All it 
takes is for the state willing to intervene (and that is logically a more powerful 
state) to state that a mass and severe breach of human rights exists or is directly 
bound to happen in the state where it wants to intervene. In addition to that, today, 
in these times of technological and communicational upsurge which more than 
ever enables various information and media manipulations, it is becoming easier 
to fabricate “evidence” of human suffering and killings, to denigrate a certain 
government and make one’s own, as well as the international public prone to the 
idea that it is necessary to resort to force in order to prevent grave atrocities.40 
We have already witnessed how easily the states (and especially the Third World 
countries) are marked as “renegade states”, “axes of evil”, and their leaders as 
enemies of mankind, evil-doers, “war lords”,  “butchers”, “executioners”, “canni-
bals” etc.  Once the scene is set in that manner, nobody asks what the real picture 
39 There is still no generally accepted definition of ethnic (national) minorities – and that is the 
prerequisite for the actual enjoyment of their guaranteed rights. It is no coincidence either 
that there is no general definition of terrorism and terrorists  - starting from their political and 
ideological positions, the states see in the perpetrators of basically identical acts terrorists in 
one situation, and fighters for freedom in the other.
40 The term «CNN syndrome» has already found its place in literature.
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is. It is easy to justify the breach of national sovereignty on that basis, hiding the 
real interests and objectives of the intervening state.41
However, practice shows that none of the interventions undertaken under 
the flag of humanity was “humanitarian” in true sense. Quite the contrary. All 
known cases from the past indicate that the states intervened under humanitarian 
pretences to cover their true (political) objectives. Interventions were as a rule 
executed in a way that implied a major or minor breach of humanitarian law, 
including the established war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
In addition to that, even if it were determined that a certain state’s regime is 
incompetent to carry out its duties (resulting in chaos) or is excessively violent, it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to determine which regime should replace it. It is not 
enough to simply send out the troops and win the war. The intervening state cannot 
simply overthrow a government and walk away.  It should supervise the transfor-
mation into a better state. And its own model does not necessarily need to suit the 
local conditions and requirements. It is easy to say that a democratic society should 
be built, but who can decide what true democracy stands for and how it should be 
achieved? The establishment of a new (better) regime is connected to other chal-
lenges. It should, as a matter of fact, last for a while, perhaps several years, and the 
tolerance of the local population is always limited. Each foreign army, even if it is 
welcomed at first, becomes the occupying force the minute it wins. It means that 
the longer it remains there, the larger resistance it will face. This inevitably leads 
to the estrangement from the local population and a greater violence.42
With these general views, the claims of the advocates of humanitarian in-
terventions that the role of the states is receding more and more and that hu-
man rights are becoming universally important, are of little significance. It is 
indisputable that the states` sovereignty is eroding more and more.43 But it is a 
process developed with the consent (or at least, without objection) of the states 
themselves.
Perhaps a superstate (a global state) or some state-continents etc. are yet to be 
created in our century. It is not up to us to deal with it here. However, until such 
41 It is repeated with reason that the electronic mass-media which play the central role in the 
new international legal process are not international officials, but profit organisations. In the 
market rat race, they are concerned with gaining bigger ratings. That affects their motives and 
priorities. And that means that their reports do not necessarily depict the real picture. There-
fore mass-media cannot replace the international institutional decision-making process. See: 
Reisman M.W.: Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Process: 
The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, European Journal of International Law, 
1/2000, p. 18.
42 Reisman M.W., Arsanjani M.H., Wiessner S., Westerman G.S.: International Law in 
Contemporary Perspective, New York 2004, pp. 259-260. 
43 See: Krivokapić B.: Međunarodno pravo: koreni, razvoj, perspektive, Beograd 2006, pp. 163-
170. and the referential literature.
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changes occur, states` sovereignty cannot be questioned. This is so due to the fact 
that sovereignty is a foundation stone of international order and to the fact that the 
mere consistent upholding of sovereignty and non-intrusion principles ensures 
protection and preservation of smaller states and world peace.
In the light of that, very interesting are the claims, even if not entirely accu-
rate, that the state as a unique guarantor of the independence of social groups and 
personality from foreign pressures is still a lesser evil than foreign intrusion, even 
if it violates their rights.44 
But if the possibility of foreign intrusion is ever to be accepted in principle, 
such action would imply numerous dilemmas, dangers and possible snares.
 1. The first concrete question is: when should an intervention occur? It does 
not suffice to say the intervention should occur in order to prevent the potential 
loss of human lives. It is a factual question which is seen in different ways by dif-
ferent parties. In addition to that, there is a risk that people could pass from think-
ing that an intervention is justifiable in order to prevent bloodshed, to the attitude 
that it can be used to prevent the events not yet occurred, even to the view that it 
is permissible to intervene for a severe breach of other fundamental human rights 
(an election theft for instance?), misleading or return of democracy etc. Hence, 
the risk that these moments would be understood arbitrarily cannot be avoided. 
2. In practice, who can humanitarian intervention be undertaken against? An-
swer: “against anyone in severe breach of human rights” is far from truth.
The requirement that the practice of humanitarian intervention be consistently 
carried out in respect to all states, should ensure a certain credibility of the whole 
idea. But, within the realms of reality, can one imagine humanitarian intervention 
against a superpower? Certainly not!
In that respect, the objects of humanitarian intervention could only be small 
and medium states, which inevitably means selectivity, and, we would not be ex-
aggerating if we say, it would mean turning the whole idea into tools for imposing 
one kind of neo-colonialism. Actually, it all points to the fact that, if the right to 
humanitarian intervention were to be legalised, it would mean that in similar situ-
ations states could resort to various solutions – depending on whether the regime 
in a given country is favoured by a respective superpower. A decision on whether 
an acceptable situation is at issue (for instance legitimate measures for fighting 
terrorism) or terrible atrocities requiring determined action would depend on that. 
However, it means that it all comes down to political and not legal decisions and 
qualifications. 
44 Gamba V.: Justified Intervention?: A View from the South, in Reed L., Keysen C. (eds.): 
Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention, Cambridge 1993, pp. 115-125, cited according to: 
Бордачев Т.: op. cit., стр. 4.
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After all, history offers numerous pieces of evidence on the fact that the stand-
point of the superpowers depended solely on their present political interests. A 
good example is that what happened with Turkey. England changed its standpoint 
on that issue many times in the 19th century, taking only into account its political 
interests and not the real reasons for the protection of human rights in Turkey. 
When it wanted to weaken Turkey, it advocated humanitarian intervention. The 
opposite case was when Turkey favoured its interests, and then England changed 
its standpoint from the core and objected to the interference into the internal af-
fairs of the sovereign state of Turkey.45
In the light of that, a fact that should be taken into account is that recently the 
USA and its allies, calling upon humanitarian reasons, have undertaken armed 
actions and were at real wars against several states and overlooked exactly the 
same drastic or worse breaches of human rights on other territories. So, for in-
stance, there were no measures undertaken in the case of humanitarian crises in 
certain states of South America, among others in Columbia.46 This was so be-
sides the fact that there was evidence that several thousands of people get killed 
each year. When in East Timor at the beginning of the 1999 atrocities escalated 
(there are claims that thousands of people were killed and about 750 000 were ex-
pelled from their homes) the USA did not react.47 Also, during the aggression of 
the NATO against SR Yugoslavia (1999), Turkey used force against the Kurdish 
people for hundredth time (17 000 soldiers accompanied by tanks and planes) and 
not on its own territory but in neighbouring Iraq! It, however obviously bothered 
no one.48 A particularly interesting is the question why was there no intervention 
in Rwanda (1994), when it was known in advance what was going to happen? 
And this was during the UN mission there.49 Reactions followed only after the 
end of genocide where, as it is considered, about 500 000-800 000 Tootsis and 
Hutus were killed.50 There are currently some new statements threatening to shed 
a whole new light on this event.51
45 More on the subject: Bartoš M.: Međunarodno javno pravo, I. knjiga, Beograd 1954,  pp. 394-395.
46 Although it had one of the worst records of human rights in the world, Columbia has been through-
out the years one of the principal beneficiaries of the USA military aid. Chomsky N.: Humanitar-
ian Intervention (2000), p. 1, http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2000-07/05chomsky.htm.
47 Ibid. http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2000-07/05chomsky.htm
48 See: Krivokapić B.: NATO agresija na Jugoslaviju – sila iznad prava, Beograd 1999, p. 19.
49 We are talking about UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda), founded in 
October 1993, and based on chapter VI of the UN Charter for the enforcement of the peace 
agreement. When violence occurred, not only did the Security Council not reinforce this mis-
sion, but it reduced its military officials from 2548 to merely 270!
50 More on the subject: Krivokapić B.: Međunarodni krivični tribunal za Ruandu,  Jugoslovenska 
revija za međunarodno pravo, 1/1997, pp. 73-89; Orrego A.J.: The Rwanda crisis Role of the 
International Community, (1995), pp. 1-15,  http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/2521.pdf. 
51 See: Black A.: Hotel Propaganda – What Really Happened in Rwanda in 1994,  Mayday Mag-
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After all, even if it wants to intervene in all situations of crisis, no state, not 
even a group of states has unlimited economic, military, human or other potential. 
It means that even if there were readiness to intervene each time an opportunity 
appeared, it would simply be impossible. And especially when the one interven-
ing should take into consideration potential great losses in it own ranks.  
The supporters of humanitarian intervention consider that if it is not possible 
to intervene at every opportunity, it is better to at least do it when the possibil-
ity occurs (and save at least those people).52 However moral and humane these 
comments may sound, they are of little use. The issue here is not that it is better 
to feed at least one hungry person than not to feed anyone. The question is about 
resorting to violent measures – hence, armed conflict with everything it implies. 
And that means that someone would (local population, and the intervening sol-
diers themselves) have to pay the price. In addition to that, selective “justice” and 
this kind of “humanity” is often worse than injustice.  Here then another logic ap-
plies, which will be well understood by criminal experts: it was said for a reason 
that it is better to leave ten culprits unpunished, rather than convict an innocent 
one by mistake. 
3. The next question is: who is allowed to intervene? Even if an armed inter-
vention for humanitarian reasons is permitted, who would be allowed to inter-
vene in practice? The answer to that would be “everyone” (provided that all other 
conditions are met). But is it so? 
Can the military intervention of Lebanon and Monaco be envisaged against 
the USA for violation of human rights? Or an attack of Albanian and Danish 
parachutists on Tienamen square in order to prevent new conflicts between the 
Chinese government and their opposition? Or a blockade of Great Britain’s coast 
by the war ships of Argentina because of the situation in Northern Ireland? Cer-
tainly not.
The intervener should, logically, be militarily superior from the state it is 
intervening against, and wealthy enough to afford the expenses of such an endea-
vour. That is certainly not the case with developing countries. Rather, in the first 
place are the world superpowers.
azine,  http://hamilton.indymedia.org/newswire/display/542/index.php. Author, among other 
things, states that it was the overthrow of the regime that occurred in Rwanda, and that the riots 
were initiated by the Tootsi tribe of which 10 000 were previously infiltrated in Kigali and 30 
000 more, armed and assisted by the USA and Great Britain, entered the country from Uganda; 
he refers to the investigation results (Hourigan Report) which determined that the shooting 
down of the plane of the Rwanda president (which instigated the conflicts) was not executed 
by the Hutus, but by the opposing side; etc.
52 As the former Secretary General of the UN noticed: “The fact remains that we cannot protect 
people everywhere, it cannot happen that we do not act when we are capable of acting. Armed 
intervention must always be the last resort, however, in the event of mass murders we must act 
upon it”. Annan K.: We the Peoples...  op. cit., par. 219. 
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 The whole idea of the right to humanitarian intervention comes down to the 
fact that the so-called “asymmetric requirement in international law”, which is 
solely aimed at the weak by the powerful.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that the main advocates of the concept of hu-
manitarian intervention are the USA and other developed states close to them. 
This is so because they perceive themselves as the ones deciding where and when 
to intervene. It is not only about military, economic and other power of those 
countries.  This concept relies on the assumption that the states in question are 
champions of democracy and human rights, which, as such, have the moral right 
and obligation to ensure that the people around the world enjoy at least a similar 
level of fundamental rights and freedoms. But, are these states morally entitled 
to such a role? 
Let us remind ourselves of several situations. Although unquestionably re-
sponsible for the formulation and adoption of numerous important international 
instruments from the human rights subject-matter, when it comes to their own 
obligations, the USA takes an entirely different standpoint. As an example, the 
USA signed the International Human Rights Pact  (1966) only eleven years after 
(in 1977), and ratified the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights on 8 
June 1992 (hence 26 years later!), and it has not yet signed the International Pact 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights! And we are talking about the most 
important documents in this subject-matter, which have 160, that is 156 member 
states.53
It is also surprising that the USA did not ratify a politically undisputable 
international agreement such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989), which is an agreement with the biggest number of members – as high as 
193. The only two states that did not ratify it are Somalia and- the USA!54 Mostly 
everything is known of the USA support of various international ad hoc criminal 
tribunals and at the same time, of its strong objection against the permanent In-
ternational Criminal  Court.55
53 Status on the day 15/4/2007, according to the UN data: http://untreaty.un.org/. 
54 Status on the day 15/4/2007, according to the UN data: http://untreaty.un.org/. 
55 The USA turned from the most vigorous advocate of international (ad hoc) criminal courts into 
the biggest opponent of the permanent International Criminal Court. The main objections of the 
USA government are that the operation of the Court could jeopardise national sovereignty of the 
country in question on the one hand, and on the other hand, there is the fear of politically moti-
vated trials. These objections are demonstrated in various ways: by withdrawing the signature 
from the Court Statute (2002), by threatening to impede the operation of the Security Council, 
by signing bilateral agreements with many states about the non-extradition of the USA citizens 
to the Court, and even by passing a special law (American Service Members’ Protection Act, 
2002) which, among other matters, provides for the prohibition of the American military aid to 
the states which ratified the Rome Statute (with possible exceptions) and empowers the presi-
dent of the USA to use military force to liberate American military officials held by the Court. 
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Once again, acknowledging their improvement of human rights in the world, 
it should be noted that the USA is, for instance, not only one of the few states that 
still practice capital punishment (128 states today have legally or de facto abolish 
capital punishment, and only 69 kept it), but by the number of executions in 2005 
(60) hold fourth position – behind China, Iran and Saudi-Arabia.56 After all, when 
we are talking about practice, we need only remind ourselves of Guantanamo, 
secret CIA prisons all over the world, proofs of torturing and molesting their pris-
oners, that the USA has the biggest percent of prisoners in the whole world, etc. 
Do the superpowers then have the moral right to determine when and where 
serious breaches of human rights occur; especially those that necessarily imply 
resort to weapons? What makes them better than other states? 
4. The issue of proportion presents a problem, i.e. how to ensure that an inter-
vention envisaged as a reaction against one evil does not turn into a much greater 
evil. Previous examples show that interventions usually led to the worsening of 
the situation, which comes as no surprise.  Once the war (an armed interven-
tion) begins, there is a latent danger that the escalation of conflicts may occur. 
It should not be forgotten that the state which is subject to intervention can be 
helped by its allies. Many other blood shedding wars started at first as relatively 
small, “surgically precise” interventions and seemingly “harmless” actions. The 
conflicts started for allegedly humanitarian reasons, usually had no humanitarian 
outcomes.  
According to that, even if it is insisted upon with reason, it is difficult to fulfil 
the famous Hippocratic principle “primum non nocere” (first, do no harm) in 
practice. In fact, practice shows that not even a relative peace was establish in 
any of the regions where humanitarian interventions occurred. Usually, foreign 
interference only changed the balance between the conflicted parties.57
5. There are other problems as well. Among other things, it has already been 
noted that insistence on the right of humanitarian intervention can encourage 
militant opposition in a country or various separatist movements to knowingly 
provoke the government to make severe breaches of human rights, so that the 
foreign interference occurs which would enable a successful realisations of their 
goals. That danger is noted and acknowledged even by the advocates of humani-
tarian intervention, as well as the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.58
56 The executions took place in only 18 more states in the world that year. Data obtained from: 
Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, http://web.amnesty.org/pag-
es/deathpenalty-facts-eng. 
57 Иноземцев В.:  op. cit., стр.  6.
58 See: Annan K.:  We the Peoples: ..., op. cit.,  par. 216-216.
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3) Several examples from practice
It has already been mentioned that there is no general consensus even among 
the supporters of humanitarian intervention on whether it implies action for the 
protection of their own citizens or, on the contrary, only for the protection of 
foreigners (citizens of the state subject to intervention). Therefore we will lay out 
several known examples for both cases, with the clear intention of pointing to 
their most important ambiguities and controversies.
1. In the past the superpowers often undertook armed interventions in the 
weaker states justifying it with the protection of their own citizens. A military ac-
tion of eight  great powers at the time is often cited. It was undertaken in China, 
as the answer to the Boxer Uprising and the related mass murders59 and to the 
jeopardising of foreign diplomats` lives.  However, although its objective was to 
save the foreigners in Beijing, the action of the international coalition60 was in 
fact undertaken to terminate the uprising. It could even be said that it was a puni-
tive expedition of colonial  powers.
The invasions of other states` territories for the alleged protection of one’s 
citizens have happened recently as well.  That is particularly the practice of the 
USA. We will mention here only few examples.61
In 1975, the revolutionary government of Cambodia seized the American com-
mercial ship “Mayaguez” with 40 crew members for entering their territorial wa-
ters. Although the Cambodian government soon sent a peaceful notice announcing 
that it would release the ship and its crew, the USA resorted to military interven-
tion. Result: in a basically unnecessary action; for the alleged rescuing of the lives 
of 40 American civilians, 41 American soldiers were killed and 50 more were 
wounded. Losses on the Cambodian side were even greater. Mere luck saved the 
crew members from being killed in the action undertaken for their “rescuing”.
 All the weaknesses of the humanitarian interventions can be seen in the ex-
amples of the few military interventions justified by reasons of humanitarian na-
ture, which were not a mere realisation of some hidden political objectives. That 
is the case with, for instance, invasion of Israeli commandos on the Entebe airport 
in Uganda (1976) for the rescuing of passengers – hostages in a hijacked plane 
landed at that airport. In that action, undertaken without consulting the Uganda 
59 It is considered that over 200 foreigners and thousands of Chinese Christians were murdered.
60 Of Japan, Russia, Great Britain, France, USA, Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary. At the 
beginning with 20 000 soldiers, and later on that number increased to about 50 000.
61 For such examples see: Shalom S.R.: op. cit., pp. 2-9; Ronzitti N.: Rescuing Nationals Abroad 
Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity, Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, 1985.
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government, the commandos managed to free the hostages, killing all the hijack-
ers, 13 Uganda soldiers and 3 hostages. Even if the legal illegitimacy of this 
operation were overlooked, there is still the question whether it could have been 
executed differently, without unnecessary casualties.  
The problems which can occur are demonstrated in the famous Larnaca in-
cident which took place in 1978. The Egyptian commandos, who flew in by a 
military plane (which was granted landing by the Cypriot government) forcefully 
intervened against the terrorists who hijacked the plane, which resulted in the 
exchange of fire between Egyptians and the Cyprus National Guard. As a result, 
the Cypriot government arrested the terrorists, but several Egyptians and Cypri-
ots were killed and wounded in that chaos which resulted in a dispute between 
the two states.62
One of the well-know cases from recent history is the US invasion of Grenada 
in 1983. This was justified by Washington in the first place by the need to protect 
the lives of about 1 000 American citizens (medical students), which would, al-
legedly, have been jeopardised due to the riots occurring in that country. The real 
reasons for the intervention were, however, of deeper nature, which can be seen 
in the fact that this action was simulated during a military exercise staged two 
years before,63 that the American troops occupied the entire island (and those 
parts where there were no American citizens) and remained there even after the 
evacuation of all American citizens64 and the fact that they did not only secure 
the American citizens, but they also overthrew the government of Grenada at the 
time. In the armed conflicts almost 100 people (unnecessarily) lost their lives – 49 
citizens of Grenada, 29 Cubans (who were there as military advisers or workers)65 
and 19 American soldiers. Several hundreds of people were wounded. In addition 
62 See: Casesse A.: International Law,  op. cit., p. 314.
63 It were military  maneuvers called «Amber and the Amberines» that took place in the Ca-
ribbean in 1981 which basically came down to the hypothetical liberation of the American 
hostages in the state of «Amber» and the establishment of a friendly government. On that and 
various moments depicting the falsehood and the absurdity of the reasons used to justify the 
invasion (it has been claimed, among other things, that Cuba could have used the airport at is-
sue to bombard Puerto Rico – and it is closer to Cuba than to Granada!) see: Shalom S.R.:  op. 
cit., pp. 9-16.
64 In this case the USA in fact tried to justify its action by humanitarian reasons and the need to 
ensure its own security (for the construction of the civil airport in Granada which, according 
to Washington, was supposed to be used for military purposes of  USSR and Cuba). Thus, the 
combination of arguments on the necessity of humanitarian intervention and the so-called pre-
emptive self-defence was at issue here. The emphasis on the fact that the intervention resulted 
from the invitation of the British General Governor, due to the collapse of the local govern-
ment, was one of the arguments for intervention. However, it is not only disputable whether he 
had the constitutional right to do so, but there are many claims that his invitation was subse-
quent to the already proceeding intervention.
65 It is considered that there were about 50 Cuban military advisors and 700 workers.
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to that, the American occupation led to a severe violation of human rights on the 
island (unlawful arrests, limitations on the right to assemble, censorship etc.). 
The entire action was in fact undertaken to overthrow the left wing regime in 
Granada, and especially to prevent the existence of a triangle whose bases would 
be Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada. The aim was to execute the first victorious 
military action (which, considering the balance of powers, could not fail) after 
the American failure in Vietnam. Strictly political reasons were at issue. Lives 
or welfare of American students were not at stake at any time (except perhaps at 
the time of their “rescuing”). Many of them did not want to be evacuated in the 
first place.66
2. Many of those who advocate the concept of military intervention consider 
that it applies only to the actions undertaken for the protection of foreign citizens 
– in the first place the citizens of the state subject to intervention. It is used in 
order to emphasise the impartiality and high level of morality of such endeav-
ours. However, practice is far from these ideals. Only several cases will be shown 
here. 
Some renowned authors list the French occupation of Lebanon and Syria 
(1860-1861) as the only true case of humanitarian intervention before WWII.  It 
was undertaken to prevent the massacre of the Maronite Christians by the Drus-
es.67 In this incident more than 11 000 of Maronite Christians were killed in only 
four weeks and 100 000 more were exiled. In connection with that, it is noted, 
however, that the British government took these incidents reservedly, calling 
upon the fact that the initial provocations were instigated by the Christians, who 
have been preparing the attack on the Druses months before. In any case, while 
the European troops were allocated, violent events were practically over and the 
troops were soon withdrawn.68
Bearing in mind that the Spanish-American War (1989-1899) is cited even 
today as an example of the true humanitarian intervention when the USA freed 
Cuba from the Spanish terror, the literature shows a completely different perspec-
tive. This is so if we take into account that at the same time the USA imposed 
upon Cuba an amendment to its Constitution (the Platt Amendment) allowing the 
USA to intervene and that for the following half of century the USA dominated 
the island.69
66 More on the subject, with the 20 years distance: Zunes S.: The US Invasion of Grenada: 
A Twenty Year Retrospective,  Foreign Policy in Focus,  www.globalpolicy.org/empire/
history/2003/10grenada.htm.  
67  Brownlie I.: Principles of Public International Law, Oxford 1995, p. 565.
68 See: Franck T.M., Rodley N.S.: After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by 
Military Force,  American Journal of International Law,  2/1973, p. 282;  Greenwood Ch.: 
Intervention, http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-28493-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html, p. 2.
69 Shalom S.R.:  op. cit.,  p. 1.
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Armed interventions for the alleged protection of foreign citizens have oc-
curred recently as well. However, there was always a doubt behind the true inten-
tions of the interveners, and there was always that debatable question of what was 
achieved and what the price of it was (mostly among the local population).
So, for instance, the USA alone intervened several times referring to humani-
tarian reasons. Here we will list only several most recent examples.
Among other things, the NATO aggression on SR Yugoslavia (1999) was 
justified by humanitarian reasons – the need to protect the Albanian population 
from the alleged Serbian repression, although the real reasons were of an entirely 
different nature and were mainly within the domain of geopolitics.70 In reality, 
certain states assisted the creation and operation of UÇK (Kosovo Liberation 
Army) first financially, then by weapons, equipment and so on. As a result of 
that the response of Serbian security forces against numerous terrorist attacks 
committed by the members of that organisation (series of murders, abduction of 
civilians, assaults on police officers etc.) was characterised as a terror of Serbian 
government on Albanian population. Although the USA and its allies were well 
acquainted with the actual circumstances (witnessed later on by the reports of the 
German Ministry for Foreign Affairs),71 the situation was used for the harsh pres-
suring of the SR Yugoslavia, and the consequent attack of the 19 NATO members 
against it.72 Result: in a savage bombarding of not only Kosovo, but of the entire 
country, according to the statistical data of the state bodies, 1002 members of 
Yugoslavia Army and Serbian police and about 2500 civilians were killed, while 
10 000 were wounded;73 SR Yugoslavia underwent severe material damage at the 
time; a large number of citizens lost their homes, jobs and finally a sea of refugees 
was set in motion – the exact ones that the NATO allegedly wanted to protect. In 
addition to that, severe ecological consequences occurred in the region (particu-
larly due to the use of ammunitions loaded with depleted uranium), and damaging 
consequences were brought upon international law as well (the example is given 
of its unpunished violation). Instead of preventing the alleged humanitarian catas-
trophe, a true tragedy of all citizens of Yugoslavia was caused, and especially of 
those residing in Kosovo. But, the consequences of the intervention were largely 
felt after the termination of these actions (after the NATO forces entered) – over 
250 000 of the non-Albanian citizens of Kosovo were exiled from their homes; 
70 More on the subject: Krivokapić B.: NATO agresija na Jugoslaviju..., op. cit, pp. 22-42.
71 On that subject see: Krivokapić B.: NATO agresija na Jugoslaviju..., op. cit., pp. 31-33; and 
especially Mitić M.: Nemački pogled na jugoslovensku krizu, Beograd 2005.
72 See the interesting review of Noam Chomsky written 2 years after the end of the NATO inter-
vention: Chomsky N.: A Review of NATO’s War over Kosovo, Z Magazine, April-May 2001, 
http://www.chomsky.info/articles/200005-htm;
73 Obeležena godišnjica bombardovanja NATO (Marking of the anniversary of the NATO bomb-
ing), «Politika» from 25 March 2007, p. 6.
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from 10 June 1999 (the day the NATO troops entered) to 9 August 2003 there 
were 6 535 attacks of Albanian extremists registered where 1201 people were 
killed, 1328 wounded and 1146 abducted.74
It has already been forgotten that in 2001 the USA used the compassion of 
the entire world in 2001 due to the tragic events of 11 September (terrorist acts 
killing 3000 people) in order to invade Afghanistan. Even though it was officially 
said that it had been executed within the framework of the war on terrorism (in 
order to capture the Al-Qaeda leaders), another objective of the intervention was 
immediately emphasized – the overthrow of the repressive Taliban government 
through democratic means. On the basis of that the USA managed to ensure the 
participation of several other NATO members. But, what was really achieved?
Instead of being protected, the civilians became casualties of the American 
bombings and military actions. According to some assessments, from 7 October 
2001 to 31 June 2002 almost 3500 of them were killed. In addition to that, as a re-
sult of foreign interference, a political and humanitarian situation emerged which 
was by far worse than the one under the Taliban government, who after all man-
aged to provide a relatively decent and peaceful life and basic security for their 
people. Afghanistan became a narco-state. The production of poppy, which was 
significantly reduced under the Taliban government, experienced an incredible 
upsurge after foreign troops entered the state.  While the Taliban regime until 2001 
reduced the cultivation of poppy to only about 8000 hectares, only a year later 
this plant used for the production of heroin covered already 74 000 hectares of 
the land, and in 2006 all 400 000 hectares. It is reliable data obtained via satellite 
shots. According to the data received by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UN-
ODC), during 2006 the production of unprocessed opium in Afghanistan reached 
6100 tons – 90% of the overall world production. This amount can be used for 
the production of 600 tons of heroin, which is by 30% higher from the global 
demands.75 As time goes by, it is more obvious that actually the strategic goal of 
the entire endeavour was to ensure the military presence of the USA in Southeast 
Asia, for the control over Middle East and Central Asia rich in oil and energy.76
The most recent example – the invasion on Iraq (2003) is one of the best and 
the most tragic ones. The main reasons used by the USA and its allies to justify 
the invasion, was the claim that Baghdad was in possession of and in the proc-
ess of developing weapons of mass destruction, which is prepared to use against 
other states, i.e. concede to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. However, 
when it became obvious that these claims were unfounded (it was later admitted 
74 Statistika stradanja (Casualties statistics), “Politika” from 24 March 2007, p. 5. 
75 Opijumski tango u Avganistanu (Opium tango in Afghanistan),  «Politika» from 10 April 2007, 
p. 4.
76 Bello W.:  op. cit.,  p. 3.
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after futile efforts to find some evidence by the USA and Great Britain); then 
instead of that, they stated that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant who had to be over-
thrown in order to ensure normal life to the suffering people of Iraq. Hence, when 
other arguments fell through, aggression on Iraq was retroactively justified by 
humanitarian reasons – intervention suddenly transformed from a “self-defence” 
to a “humanitarian” one.77
Everything occurring in Iraq from 2003 until today had little to do with human 
rights and humanity; hence it is noted with reason that calling upon humanitarian 
reasons is entirely inappropriate in this case. Saddam`s regime is, as it appears, 
really responsible for heinous atrocities (for instance when tens of thousands of 
Kurdish people were killed in 1988). But all those crimes happened in the past. 
At the time of the attack on Iraq (without the mandate of the Security Council – 
therefore violating the UN Charter) no mass murders occurred nor the Iraqi gov-
ernment executed repression as it had been doing decades before.78 The situation 
in Iraq at the time when foreign troops executed invasion, was not so exceptional 
that it required foreign military interference, and even if it were, such a measure 
would not be the only solution. In fact, even with the rhetoric of Washington and 
London, the attack on Iraq in 2003 cannot be qualified as humanitarian interven-
tion. It is admitted even by those who advocate this doctrine.79
It is obvious that attack on Iraq was not undertaken for humanitarian reasons. 
The central issues were oil and intention to overthrow the disobedient regime.80 
The least important were the interests of Iraqi people, whose opinion mattered 
to no one. In addition to that, not only was the intervention undertaken without 
the Security Council’s consent, but it was undertaken in a way that took little 
account of international humanitarian law. To confirm that, it would suffice to 
remind ourselves that in certain battles (for instance for Fallujah) the Americans 
used inhumane chemical weapons (white phosphorus); there are claims from the 
American ranks themselves that during the battle for the Baghdad airport, they 
resorted to some kind of tactical nuclear weapons etc. The public is familiar with 
episodes such as the torturing of war prisoners in Abu Gharaib prison; existence 
77 See the reasons for the attack on Iraq given by the president George Bush, and American and 
British Secretaries of Foreign Affairs Condoleezza Rice and Jack Straw in: Reisman M.W., 
Arsanjani M.H., Wiessner S., Westerman G.S.:  op. cit., pp. 253-254.
78 It could be argued that the intervention was necessary so that Saddam Hussein and other cul-
prits would be punished, at least later on. However, in that case it is not humanitarian interven-
tion anymore, but some sort of a punitive expedition. But even those who usually support this 
concept are against intervention for the sake of punishment of the culprits.  
79 Roth K.:  op. cit.,  pp. 5-6.
80 It is interesting to note that very recently the American experts have discovered new oil fields 
in the west Iraq, and the reserves of about 100 billion barrels. If these assessments are accu-
rate, Iraq is bound to become the second largest oil field, just after Saudi Arabia. See: Progon 
Iračana (Persecution of the Iraqis), «Politika» from 22 April 2007, p. 2.
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of secret prisons and torture centres organised by new Iraqi authorities (the Brit-
ish troops have recently invaded such a centre by mistake),81 obvious breaches 
of fundamental rights of Saddam Hussein and the other accused in the process 
against them, followed by a brutal execution of the former Iraqi president and his 
closest associates etc.
Even though during the previous regime Iraq was not the most favourable 
place to live, it was still a stable country, which is now facing downfall. Accord-
ing to some assessments, (among others that of «Human Rights Watch»), during 
the quarter century of Saddam`s government about 250 000 Iraqis were killed, 
and during only 4 years of occupation, the number of dead ranges from 150 000 
to 750 000.82 According to data provided by the UN High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees (UNHCR), in 4 years of war about  3,9 million Iraqis were forced to leave 
their homes, of which 1,9 million were relocated internally and about 2 million 
escaped to neighbouring countries, primarily to Syria  and Jordan.83 
It is no coincidence that the Iraqi people themselves, faced with chaos, death, 
lack of order, security and personal safety as well as those fiercely opposing 
Saddam`s regime, publicly state that “things were better before”,84 that “now peo-
ple are acting the same way as in Saddam`s era, maybe even worse”.85
After all, that was confirmed by the UN Secretary General at the time, Kofi 
Annan, although at the very end of his mandate in his last interview for the BBC 
at the beginning of December in 2006, when he stated that Iraq was facing a civil 
war and that the Iraqi people were in a worse position than at the time of Saddam 
Hussein. Annan stated with reason: “If I were an average Iraqi obviously I would 
make the same comparison, that they had a dictator who was brutal but they had 
their streets, they could go out, their kids could go to school and come back home 
without a mother or father worrying, “Am I going to see my child again?”.86 Al-
81 See: Tajno mučilište u Basri (Secret torture chamber in Basra), «Politika» from 6 March 2007, 
p. 3.
82 The actual number of casualties is unknown. In 2006 the American president George Bush 
delivered his estimate of about 30 000 killed, but that was disputed all over the world. Among 
other things, the current Minister of Health in Iraq gave the estimate of about 150 000 dead, 
and there are even estimates that amount to as many as 943 000 dead! More on the subject: 
Bandow D.: The Painful Death of Humanitarian Intervention, November 3, 2006, p. 4, http://
www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9951. 
83 The Iraq Situation, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/tehis/vtx/iraq?page=news&id=462621bb4.
84 This was stated by a certain Kadim al-Jabouri, one of  key participants in the tearing down of 
the Saddam Hussein’s monument. See: Irački lom (The Iraqi downfall), «Politika» from 10 
April 2007, p. 1.
85 This was stated by I. Alawi, chosen by the Americans to be the first prime minister after the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Cited according to: Bandow D.:  op. cit.,  p. 6.
86 Kofi Annan interview: Text, BBC News, 4.12.2006, p. 2, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_
depth/6205056.stm.
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though the so-called “hindsight” is at issue here, (why were these words not heard 
before?), it depicts not only the present situation in Iraq, but a common place for 
all similar situations. 
Instead of liberation from dictatorship, Iraq faced a nightmare. Contrary to 
claims of the highest structures of the American administration that they will 
transform it into a profusion of stability and democracy, Iraq turned into a source 
of regional instability and a synonym for pain and suffering.  However, those 
nightmares extended to conquerors as well -  in 4 years 3242 American soldiers, 
134 British soldiers and 124 soldiers from other countries pertaining to the Coali-
tion forces were killed,87 and many more were wounded (about 30 000); several 
cases were reported of sexual violation of women allocated throughout the Amer-
ican forces – by their fellow-soldiers and superiors;88 this action was widely con-
demned within the international framework but as well by experts, intellectuals 
and activists of the very states engaged in Iraq.89 There is a critical perception of 
this war in the eyes of the public of the USA itself.90
3. The aforementioned examples indicate at least three common traits of simi-
lar actions: 1) they were undertaken contrary to the basic rules of the contempo-
rary international law (they represented the acts of aggression); 2) there was no 
real motive for such drastic measures and 3) in the end casualties and generally 
negative consequences exceeded by far the potential victims (if any) had the ac-
tion not been undertaken.
In addition to that, all examples from history show that no such action was 
ever motivated by philanthropy or other selfless reasons. There lies one of the ba-
sic reasons why such practice is prohibited and even abolished in the 20th century. 
Although, occasionally, some armed interventions occurred which were justified 
by humanitarian reasons, their true (political) background usually became ap-
parent soon. Today, when war is declared an international crime, support of the 
humanitarian intervention doctrine would not only mean a major step back, but it 
would breed more possibilities for various abuses, and especially for the realisa-
tion of selfish interests of superpowers to the detriment of minor (weaker) states. 
History has, after all, taught us that that was always the case in similar situations. 
87 U Iraku poginula 3.242 američka vojnika (In Iraq 3 242 American soldiers killed), «Politika» 
from 27 March 2007, p. 3.
88 Silovanje po komandi (Rape by command), «Politika», 23 March 2007, p. 30.
89 See, among other readings: Simpson G.: The War in Iraq and International Law,  Melbourne 
Journal of International Law, vol. 6, 1/2005, pp. 167-188,     http://mjil.law.unimelb.edu.au/
archive/2005(1)/07Simpson.pdf.
90 Currently 59% respondents think that it was wrong for the USA to enter that war, and ¾ sug-
gest the congressmen should demand that the American troops withdraw from Iraq. Cited 
according to: SAD u Iraku: gubici rastu, podrška opada (USA in Iraq: increasing losses, de-
creasing support), «Politika» from 7 March 2007, p. 3.
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Practice show us that humanitarian goals are not achieved through violent meth-
ods, but on the contrary, more sufferings are caused. Finally, to all that has been 
said so far, we need to add that each so-called humanitarian intervention makes 
way for another similar action, at the other end of the world.91 At the same time, 
it means attack on the present international law and the established system of 
relations. 
In fact, many things point to the fact that the national sovereignty of the states 
cannot be forcefully violated (not by invasion nor by destabilisation), even when 
it is believed that a state’s regime is systematically violating fundamental human 
rights. “Getting rid of a repressive regime or a dictator is the responsibility of the 
citizens of a country.”92
Hence, even though the supporters of humanitarian intervention are trying to 
justify such actions and present them as legitimate, even desirable sometimes,93 
no unilateral armed interventions are and cannot become acceptable (undertaken 
without the UN Security Council decision). It cannot be affected by referring to 
humanitarian, moral or similar reasons.94
4. Conditions of permissibility
So, can one intervene for humanitarian reasons? 
Yes, but only through non-violent means. Everything else is in opposition to 
the entire international legal order built for generations. And that order and its 
solutions are the way they are for a reason.
First of all, when a humanitarian catastrophe is likely to occur, certain pre-
emptive measures can and should be undertaken – mediation, offer of good serv-
ices, aid etc. Then there is a whole set of incentive and similar measures which 
91 “In other words, the road to Iraq would have been more difficult without the humanitarian 
intervention in Yugoslavia in the 1990’s.” - Bello W.:  op. cit.,  p. 2.
92 Bello W.:  op. cit.  p. 1. This author, who is a professor in the Philippines, emphasises the fact 
that even in the period of the strictest regime of president Marcos, the antifascist movement did 
not think for a second to ask the USA to do their work. 
93 It is interesting to note that some international non-governmental organisations dealing with 
the protection of human rights accept that in certain cases (extreme situations that cannot be 
delayed) intervention is possible even without prior sanctions of the UN Security Council. This 
is just to avoid that a permanent member of the Council vetoes the delivering of the positive 
decision. See: Roth K.:  op. cit., p. 9.
94 This is something that many legal authors, as well as intellectuals and peace activists agree with 
around the world and in the USA. Among other readings, see the following reviews: Lobel J., 
Ratner M.: Foreign Policy in Focus,  1/2000, pp. 1-3, http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol5/01ifhum.
pdf; Finnemore M.: Paradoxes in Humanitarian Intervention, 2000, 21 pp., www.socsci.uci.
edu/gracs/research/working_papers/martha_finnemore_humanitarian_intervention.pdf; Isbis-
ter R.: Humanitarian intervention: ethical endeavours and the politics of interest, 15 pp., http://
www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/hiproject/no1_paper1.html; Bandow D.:  op. cit., 8 pp.
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can be used by international organisations and certain states (the promise of ad-
mission to an international organisation, if the existing state is improved, the 
promise of technical help, loan etc.). There is a large number of other political 
means of influence, such as various forms of diplomatic interventions, condition-
ing the giving of loans, threats of terminating military aid and co-operation etc. 
When international organisations are at issue, in the first place the United Nations, 
there are other measures at their disposal, such as conditioning the admission to 
the membership, and as a last resort there is the introduction of sanctions, such 
as suspension of membership rights,  exclusion from membership, termination of 
diplomatic relations, isolation etc.95 Sanctions can be imposed directly upon the 
leaders of the state in question (freezing accounts abroad, prohibiting travel to 
other countries etc.). The list of peaceful, non-violent and yet efficient means of 
interventions for humanitarian reasons is long and gets longer by the day.96
Hence, even if a state is in systematic breach of human rights, the appropri-
ate response is not to send commandos to overthrow the governing regime, but 
it is a combination of an entire array of measures and sanctions permitted under 
international law.    
It is obvious hat such intervention would exceed the framework of what is 
usually implied by humanitarian intervention. This is because it is not executed 
by weapons. But precisely because of that has good chances of success.
 But what happens with military intervention for humanitarian reasons? If 
such an action without the mandate granted by the Security Council (unilateral 
intervention) is illegal, what about the possibility that the Security Council ex-
ecutes or orders such measures?
Art. 2/7 of the UN Charter prohibits the Organisation itself to “to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. How-
ever, it is indisputable that in our time the issues of fundamental human rights 
and freedoms have exceeded the state borders. On the other hand, the mentioned 
regulation has a sequence – it contains an exception enabling the United Nations 
to interfere with the internal conflicts which endanger world peace. In such and 
only such situations, the Security Council would, after establishing the breach or 
endangerment of world peace and security, have the right to order coercive meas-
95 These sanctions, however, have to be carefully thought through so that they do not affect the 
already suffering population instead of the regime they are aimed at. Illustrative example of a 
pernicious action is the UN sanction against the former Republic of Yugoslavia and especially 
against Iraq. For Iraq see: International Law and Interventionism in the «New World Order», 
Madrid 2000, especially these reviews: Halliday D.J.: Economic Sanctions on the People of 
Iraq: First Degree Murder or Manslaughter? (pp. 15-22); Al-Qaysi R.: The Legal and Humani-
tarian Actions of the United Nations against Iraq Pursuant to the Gulf War (pp. 23-100) i Al-
Bayoumi A.: Sanctions, Strikes and «Oil-For-Food» Program: Humanitarianism of the New 
World Order (pp. 107-125). 
96 More on the subject: The Responsibility to Protect:  op. cit.,  pp. 29-31.
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ures, referring to Chapter VII of the Charter. It means that it can, when it finds it 
necessary, order the use of armed forces.
However, even if it decides to do so, the Council would actually only use the 
responsibilities and rights granted by the Charter. The armed action which would 
occur on the Security Council order would be undertaken for the breach of inter-
national peace and not for the breach of human rights as such. Such a situation 
could only cause the Council to reconsider this issue. But only if on the basis of 
all information it is concluded that in a given situation there is an endangerment 
or breach of world peace and security, the Council could order the measures in 
question. Therefore, from the legal standpoint, no new institution is at issue here, 
but one of the situations that, as the Council establishes, pose a threat to peace or 
breach of international peace and security. Even if in political documents, media 
etc. such an action would be characterised as “humanitarian intervention”, in fact 
it would not mean anything. The Security Council has no right to order coercive 
measures, and especially armed actions solely on the basis of human rights.
 On the other hand, the fact remains that since recently the Security Council 
has started to interpret its competences in a much broader manner. By Resolution 
688 (1991), in point one, it condemned “the repression of the Iraqi civilian popu-
lation in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas” 
and estimated that its consequences “threaten international peace and security in 
the region”. The Council, using Resolution 794 (1992), concluded a year later 
with regards to the situation in Somalia that a  “human tragedy caused by the 
conflict in Somalia... constitutes a threat to international peace and security”.97 
However, it would be wrong to conclude that the Security Council can resort to 
coercive measures, based on section VII of the Charter, whenever there is a se-
vere breach of human rights.
Although in fact the Security Council on several occasions characterised se-
vere violations of human rights as a threat to world peace, such qualification can 
be accurate, but not always. In other words, we are not certain that the Council 
would (especially considering the fact that “the honeymoon” of its permanent 
leading members is, as it appears, ending, and new cold war is in sight) continue 
to be willing to do so. Strictly legally speaking, the Security Council will be enti-
tled to order armed interventions for humanitarian reasons in situations which do 
not objectively jeopardise world peace,  if and when the Charter is altered in that 
direction. And for now, as it seems, it is not prepared for it.
 It should be borne in mind that the Council contains only 15 representatives 
out of 192 UN members. Can we, even if hypothetically, exclude the possibility 
that the Security Council is not acting in an objective manner, but by a dictate or 
an agreement of  great powers? And then order an armed action against a state, 
97  Read the texts of the mentioned Security Council resolutions at www.un.org/Docs/scres/. 
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even if there is no breach of human rights within it? Is that not possible? Anyway, 
it has already been noted that, after the collapse of the bipolar balance of powers, 
the Security Council began transforming into an instrument for the promotion of 
strategic interests of  the sole great power.98
And is it conceivable for the Council (even if it had such authorisation) to order 
an armed humanitarian intervention against a superpower? Certainly not! Firstly, 
it would be impossible to make such a decision because of the veto of the state in 
question (if one of five permanent Council members is at issue). However, even if 
they adopt such a decision, it would basically mean the beginning of WWIII and 
no reasonable person would agree to it. Hence, bearing in mind its composition 
and way of deciding, it must be taken into account that the Council decisions on 
humanitarian (armed) interventions could be rather arbitrary and more a result of 
compromises achieved through satisfaction of selfish interests of the leading ac-
tors (the great powers) than the result of some objective perception. 
To conclude, the present situation is that humanitarian intervention, i.e. the 
foreign interference through military action due to humanitarian reasons, if toler-
able at all, can be permitted only in extreme situations and solely on the basis of 
the UN Security Council decision delivered because in this case the Council estab-
lished that there is a breach or endangerment of international peace and security. 
Even if at a certain moment the competences of the Security Council expand 
in the sense of the right to decide on whether to intervene by force for purely 
humanitarian reasons, at least four conditions should be met previously: 1) en-
largement of the Council, so that it can represent worthily the international com-
munity; 2) such decisions should be delivered by a qualified majority; 3) if the 
present right of veto is not to be abolished, then at least the permanent Council 
members should be denied the right to use it when deciding on these issues; and 
4) armed humanitarian actions should be reserved exclusively for the permanent 
UN forces specialised in such interventions. This is all due to the simple truth that 
the more the intervention is excluded from the partial interests of actual states, 
especially the superpowers, the greater the chances are that it will be just and ac-
cepted as legitimate by the conflicted parties and the international community.99
III.  PREVENTIVE SELF-DEFENCE
(Pre-emptive use of force)
Problem of the potential right of the state to a so-called pre-emptive self-
defence has been known from ancient times. Although in the meantime this issue 
98 Köchler H.:  The Use of Force in the New International Order: On Problematic Nature of 
the Concept of “Humanitarian Intervention”, in: International Law and Interventionism in the 
“New World Order”, Madrid 2000, pp. 127-128.
99 Coady C.A.J.:  op. cit., p. 26. 
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has lost its importance (because the UN Charter prohibits the use of force), it has 
become current again in our time.100
Firstly, a certain terminological difference must be emphasised which cannot 
be recognised in many languages, but it is present in Anglo-Saxon military and po-
litical terminology. The difference is made between preventive self-defence in the 
sense of the pre-emptive strike or attack (pre-emptive strike, pre-emptive attack, 
pre-emptive self-defence) at the time of the forthcoming conflict and preventive 
war (preventive self-defence, preventive war).101 This differentiation became par-
ticularly important after 2002 and the turnover in the American security strategy.
1. Pre-emptive strike. –  There is an understanding  according to which the 
right to self-defence implies, among other things, the right to defend oneself from 
the attacks not yet begun, but is unquestionably bound to occur very soon if not 
immediately. It is considered that in such a situation (for instance if the enemy 
piled up his troops at the border with the obvious intention to use them for attack) 
it is permitted to forestall the enemy by attacking him in order to gain certain 
military advantage. Hence, some think that, under certain conditions, the attack 
undertaken to prevent the forthcoming attack of the opponent or to decrease its 
damaging consequences presents one aspect of legitimate self-defence.   Condi-
tions under which this kind of self-defence is permitted were formulated by the 
American Secretary General Webster in 1842, in his correspondence with his 
British colleague, on the occasion of a famous dispute concerning the destruc-
tion of the “Caroline” ship by the British (Caroline case).102 In his view, such 
self-defence is justified only if three conditions are met: 1) that there is “a direct 
and inevitable danger, which leaves no possibility of choice or time to reflect”; 2) 
100 On various aspects of that issue see, among other things: Ackerman D.M.: International Law 
and the Preemptive Use of Force Against Iraq, CRS Report for Congress, April 11, 2003, 
http://www.dean.usma.edu/department/law/lawandterr/Preemptive%20Use%20Force%20
Iraq.pdf;  Byers M.: Iraq and the «Bush Doctrine» of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence, http://www.
crimesofwar.org/print/expert/bush-Byers-print.html; Champion S.: Anticipatory (Pre-emptive) 
Self-defence: The Need for a Modern Approach, http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE05/
Chamoion05.html; Currie D.E.J.: «Preventive War» and International Law After Iraq, http://
www.globelaw.com/Iraq/Preventive_war_after_iraq.htm; Dworkin A.: Iraq and the «Bush Doc-
trine» of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence, http://www.crimesofwar.org/print/expert/bush-introBush-
print.html; Ghista G.: Pre-Emptive Invasion and International Law, http://www.globalresearch.
ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=1477, Котляр В.С.: Право на превентивную самооборону и 
современное международное право, Государство и право  10/2005, стр. 75-83; Welsh S.C.: 
Preemptive War and International Law, http://www.cdi.org/news/law/preemptive-war.cfm. 
101 See for instance the dictionary of military terminology of the USA Department of Defense: 
DOD Doctrine of Military Terms, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/index.html. 
102 For the Caroline case including the texts of correspondence between the Secretaries of Foreign 
Affairs of the two states Webster and Lord Ashburton, see: Harris D.J.: Cases and Materials on 
International Law, London 1979, pp. 676-677. 
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that the action undertaken on this basis is not «unreasonable or excessive», and 
3) that the action is “limited by the need of self-defence and preserved within its 
framework”.
In the opinion of many, these rules are accepted as a part of the international 
customary law. The need to meet all these conditions (in order to speak of the 
measures of self-defence before the attack in the first place) was confirmed in 
the Nurnberg judgment in 1946. Dismissing the defence claims that the German 
attack on Norway in 1941 was an act of self-defence, undertaken in order to fore-
stall the invasion of the Allies, the International Military Tribunal established that 
the pre-emptive action on the foreign territory is justified only “in the event of 
forthcoming and inevitable necessity of self-defence, which leaves no possibility 
of choice of means or a moment to reflect”.103 Hence, under conditions formu-
lated by Webster in the «Caroline case».104
Many, in the first place the Anglo-Saxon politics and doctrine, consider this 
rule valid in our time as well. In connection with that, it is emphasised that it 
cannot be expected from a state which will inevitably be struck by aggression to 
peacefully await  the attack and only then start to backfire. This is, particularly 
in our times, due to the lethal and destructive power of modern weapons. The 
realisation that in particular cases pre-emptive strike is permitted, found its place 
in the aforementioned Commission report founded by the UN Secretary General 
of the time, Kofi Annan.105
As proof that the right to this aspect of self-defence has become in a way a 
part of the international customary law, a case from the practice is often cited – 
the attack of Israel on Egypt which instigated the so-called Six-Day War (1967). 
Calling upon the fact that Egypt gathered its troops in the Sinai district, Israel 
characterised its action as defensive, justifying it with the necessity to forestall 
the attack against its own territory. It was widely accepted around the world. 
Even the Security Council and General Assembly of the UN refused proposals 
to convict Israel for aggression. Instead, the Council adopted the Resolution 242 
(1967) inviting Israel to withdraw from the occupied territory and at the same 
time seeking the termination of all states of warfare and the confirmation of ter-
ritorial integrity and the right of each country of the region to live in peace.106
However, the fact that the conception of pre-emptive self-defence is repre-
sented in the Anglo-Saxon military, political and even legal literature, does not 
103 Nirnberška presuda (The Nurnberg judgement), Beograd 1948, p. 71.
104 In connection with the mentioned attitudes of the Nurnberg judgement, it has to be taken into 
account, among other things, that they refer to the state (attack on Norway) prior to the imple-
mentation of the UN Charter. 
105 A more secure world: Our shared responsibility,  op. cit.,  par. 188, p. 54.
106 Resolution 242 (1967) of 22.11.1967, http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scre67.htm. 
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mean that it is generally accepted. In fact, if such a solution was deemed reason-
able in the past, after the adoption of the UN Charter and the general prohibition 
of the use of force, it is no longer acceptable. Strictly speaking, no pre-emptive 
violent actions undertaken for the sake of defence against attacks not yet occurred, 
are in line with the present international law. Moreover, according to Art. 2 of the 
Definition of Aggression (Resolution of the UN General Assembly 3314/1974) 
the instigation of the use of military force presents prima facie evidence of the 
execution of aggression.
In addition to that, the possibilities of abuse are numerous. Is it not real to 
expect that the aggressive state, through manipulations of intelligence data, false 
analyses etc. knowingly fabricates the factual state in order to attack another coun-
try by referring to the necessity of pre-emptive self-defence and go unpunished?
The aforementioned example from the 1967 Six-Day War, which gained a 
completely different perspective in the light of new discoveries, demonstrates 
that the actual danger is at issue. Namely, since recently it has been emphasised 
that the State Department documents from which they have recently (in 2004) 
removed the tag of confidentiality, indicate that Israel did not attack Egypt in 
order to prevent the attack against its own territory, but to assume power over the 
territories in question. The attack was executed even though Tel Aviv had reliable 
data that Egypt was not going to attack (the president of Egypt, Naser, guaranteed 
the American president Johnson he would not make the first attack, justifying the 
gathering of the troops by the intention to prevent the reoccurrence of 1956).107
The problem with this conception can be observed in another example. If Iraq 
struck first on February 2003, when it was clear that the attack of the “Coalition 
of the Willing” was going to be launched, how would Washington and London 
see it? As an act of self-defence? Or as aggression? The answer is self-imposed. 
But it really points to the fact that this conception should be the privilege of the 
powerful states exclusively.
 When it comes to possible abuses, it should be especially taken into account 
that in practice the state which executed or is ready to execute this kind of “pre-
emptive” strike will not hold necessary to present any tangible evidence to prove 
that its safety is truly directly endangered. It will most probably only call upon 
its intelligence sources and “verified information”, and will refuse, “for security 
reasons”, to present concrete information on the nature of danger and its sources 
(not to “reveal” or “jeopardise” its intelligence agents). In other words, it will 
most often present the world public only with its own beliefs that it is exposed to 
immediate danger. 
107 See: Smith G.F.: Deadly Dogma #1 Strike «First», Excerpt from “Deadly Dogma: How Neo-
conservatives Broke the Law to Deceive America”, Institute for Research Publishing, 2006, 
Chapter 1 (pp. 29-36), http://www.irmep.org/dd_ch1.htm, pp. 2-5.
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However, even if we are to put aside all presented arguments, does anyone 
even consider the fact that the respective government (which decides on such 
a step) could genuinely be mistaken and start a war as a result of that? In other 
words, it would lead to the occurrence of the actual conflict instead of the pos-
sible one, with all its tragic consequences. But how can someone be certain that 
the attack will actually occur? That the other side is not simply clinking with its 
weapons? Or that it will not refrain from the attack at the last moment?
Finally, the restriction that these actions are possible only in particular situa-
tions, although logical, has no actual meaning. Every exception has the tendency 
to turn into a rule.
2. Preventive self-defence. – According to the aforementioned, pre-emptive 
(thwarting) self-defence is not permitted even from the standpoint of interna-
tional law, not for a matter of principle nor from the standpoint of the known 
practice. However, not only did they not abandon the idea, but on the contrary 
they advocated the attitudes which would, roughly speaking, under the pretences 
of pre-emptive self-defence legalise acts which represent aggression according to 
the international law.
 The matter of fact is that since recently the idea of pre-emptive self-defence 
is comprehended in an utterly different way. Unlike the attacks whose precondi-
tions for the direct emergence of war seek to weaken the opponent’s strike (pre-
emptive strike), preventive self-defence tends to be institutionalised (legalised) as 
the use of force undertaken on the basis of a belief that military conflict, even if 
it is not forthcoming, is inevitable and its delay presents great risk. Hence, in this 
case, no forthcoming opponent’s attack is at issue, but the goal is, as explained, to 
prevent the possible attack in the future.
 Until recently the most well-known example of argumentation from those 
aspects regarding the attack on other states (although without the formulation of 
the doctrine itself) is again connected to Israel, which bombarded and destroyed 
the nuclear reactor built in Iraq in 1981.  Tel Aviv justified this action by the fact 
that Iraq, which was at war three times with Israel, contests the very existence 
of the state of Israel and that it developed a nuclear programme to create nuclear 
weapons to destroy Israel. The UN Security Council, however, unanimously and 
strongly condemned Israel’s military attack, “in clear violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations and the norms of international conduct”, called upon Israel to 
refrain in the future from any such acts or threats thereof,  determining that Israel 
is required to pay the appropriate indemnity.108 Hence, this attempt of extending 
the right to self-defence did not succeed.
However, during the last several years the USA made use of this idea and 
tried to develop a new concept which tends to alter essentially the classic under-
standing of right to self-defence.
108 Resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1981/scres81.htm.
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 After the infamous terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001, the 
government decided to undertake a series of measures. Some of them were not dis-
putable at all, but a number of them stem from the framework provided by interna-
tional law. Generally speaking, it can be noted that the USA (concerned for its own 
safety, and aware of the possible dangers, primarily terrorist attacks),  instead of 
using the right way to engage in removing the causes of these phenomena, are more 
prone to seeking a solution in the domain of the use of force. Special significance 
is granted to the fact that Washington on 20 September 2002 came forward with a 
new official strategic concept named “The USA National Security Strategy.”109 The 
strategy resides in the assumptions of an indisputable military power of the USA, 
unilateral actions, pre-emptive military strikes, claims that in the war against terror-
ism no distinction would be made between the terrorists and their accomplices and 
the attempts to ensure “democracy, freedom and security” throughout the world. 
Referring to the necessity of the fight against terrorism, this new concept 
unambiguously determined that the USA assumes the right to resort to the use 
of force at its own discretion, in the guise of preventive self-defence. The United 
Nations are mentioned in the Conception, contained in 31 pages, only twice and 
in a very marginal way, and the Security Council is not mentioned at all.110
This new approach is sometimes defined as a “search for unilateral, indepen-
dent approaches in relation to the threats against the American security which 
advocates military attack on aggressive opponents before they attack the USA, in 
order to thwart their aggression”.111 
Washington’s standpoint is that in new circumstances the so-called “doctrine 
of intimidation” no longer suffices, and that it is especially inefficient against 
the enemy who is too irrational to be intimidated by a potential retribution.112 
Thus “the fight must be transferred onto the enemy’s territory, his plans must be 
thwarted and it is indispensable that the worst threats be confronted before they 
even occur”. This attitude implies a swift first strike carried out in order to defeat 
the opponent before he can organise the counter strike for retribution. In simple 
words, this means advocating pre-emptive wars against other states.113 
109 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc.html. A radical turnover in the politics of Washington was indicated in fact in 
the speech of president Bush to the cadets of the West Point Military Academy (1 June 2002).
110 The UN was first mentioned when there was word about the USA`s attachment to such a reli-
able and stable institution as the OUN, and the second time when the co-operation of the USA 
with the UN was at issue regarding the help to rebuild Afghanistan.
111 Kegli Č. V. Jr., Vitkof J.R.: op. cit.,  p. 707.
112 That is how the Bush administration, among other things, explained the need for the pre-emp-
tive strike against Iraq claiming that it was necessary to prevent the regime of Saddam Hussein 
to get hold of weapons of mass destruction which would be used against the USA and, on the 
other hand, because of the irrational behaviour of the Iraqi dictator, there was no other solution 
except for the invasion on Iraq.
113 Kegli Č. V. Jr., Vitkof J. R.: op. cit.,  pp. 707-708.
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Hence, official Washington, and with it a part of the doctrine,114 emphasise 
and in many ways tend to defend the idea of such use of force as an aspect of 
(preventive) self-defence. The coerced use of force is mentioned in order to pre-
vent the enemy strike which would denote certain harsh and irretrievable losses 
and consequences (especially as a result of the potential use of weapons of mass 
destruction).     
However, it was mentioned before that the contemporary international law 
does not allow pre-emptive strikes; not even in the situation of a forthcoming 
attack. It is clear then that no so-called self-defence from the attack which might 
occur some day can be legal.115
This conception, with all aforementioned, is not acceptable also for moral or 
various other reasons. It does not specify any objective criterion used to deter-
mine the existence of a threat; it rejects a collective approach when estimating a 
certain situation and leaves the decision on whether the threat truly exists to the 
interested government (in this case to the USA government). Among other things, 
it would enable many abuses, marginalise the role of the UN Security Council 
and have the inevitable tendency of the ever expanding use in practice (of various 
states) etc. 
It appears that the creators of the new American conception imply that the 
right to this kind of preventive self-defence is reserved exclusively for the USA. 
However,   there are no exclusive rights. If one country can do it, so can the 
others. The American conception caused the swift response of Russia. The state-
ments on the state of preparedness to execute preventive strikes on the terrorist 
bases in any part of the world, without asking for anyone’s permission, were  ut-
tered during the last couple of years by the Russian Minister of Defence Ivanov 
and his deputy Balujevskij.116
In fact, it is rather clear that the idea of preventive self-defence can lead to in-
ternational chaos. It enables complete freedom to resort to force, especially when 
114 See for instance: Arend A.C.: International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force, The 
Washington Quarterly 2/2003, 2003, pp. 89-103, http://www.twq.com/03spring/docs/03spring_ar-
end.pdf; Feinstein L., Slaughter A.-M.: A Duty to Prevent,  Foreign Affairs,  1/2004, pp. 136-150; 
Sofaer A.D.: On the Necessity of Pre-emption, European Journal of International Law  2/2003, pp. 
209-226; Benvenisti E.: The US and the Use of Force: Double-edged Hegemony and the Manage-
ment of Global Emergencies, European Journal of International Law  4/2004, pp. 667-700.
115 Majority of authors agree with that; see, among other readings: Bock A.: Preventive or Pre-
emptive War?, http://www.antiwar.com/bock/b091002.html; Bothe A.: Terrorism and the Le-
gality of Pre-emptive Force, European Journal of International Law 2/2003, pp. 227-240; 
Chomsky N.: Preventive War “The Supreme Crime”, http://www.informationclearinghouse.
info/article4416.htm; Long B., Pitts Ch.: War, Law and American Democracy, 5 pp., http://
www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/war_law_4028.jsp,  and the referential 
literature cited there.
116 Котляр В.С.:  op. cit., стр. 82.
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dealing with disobedient regimes. As one author noticed, it is an open season on 
anyone who disagrees with you.117
The aforementioned report of the Kofi Annan Commission, although it permits 
under certain circumstances pre-emptive strikes as an aspect of self-defence, it also 
opposes the broadening of the notion of self-defence. It is explicitly stated that even 
when there are serious arguments in favour of the pre-emptive military action, sub-
stantiated by good evidence, they should be passed on to the UN Security Council, 
which, if it deems necessary, can approve of such measure. In the report it is noted 
that “the risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it con-
tinues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, 
as distinctive from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted.”118
The following imaginary example demonstrates the potential consequences. 
If by any case this strategy were in force immediately after WWII, it would mean 
that then the USA had the right to attack the USSR to prevent it from becoming 
a nuclear power (in order to protect itself from a potential nuclear attack by the 
USSR in the future). We know now that such attack and “preventive self-defence” 
never occurred. Fortunately.
But we have another, unfortunately real example, in front of our eyes. The 
USA and Great Britain attacked Iraq in 2003, allegedly because they had reliable 
sources stating that it produces weapons of mass destruction, which it intends to 
use on the USA and its allies.  No concrete evidence was presented, but that was 
enough to proclaim Iraq a “renegade state”, part of the “axis of evil” with aggres-
sive intentions towards the USA, stockpiling weapons of mass destruction and 
posing a constant threat to the USA.119 
However, after the Alliance invaded Iraq, it was definitely confirmed that 
these claims were unfounded, which was consequently admitted by the govern-
ments of the related states.  Even four years later the USA and Great Britain did 
not withdraw from Iraq, the population of which lives in horror and suffering on 
a daily basis. Instead of a tolerable life under dictatorship, the country is now in 
complete chaos, misery and desperation.120
117 Foster Ch.: International law: another casualty of the Iraq war?,  Contemporary Review,  August 
2003, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2242/is_1651_283/ai_107897404, p. 1.
118 A more secure world: Our shared responsibility,  op. cit.,  pars. 189-191, pp. 54-55.
119 Charlesworth H.: Is International Law Relevant to the War in Iraq and its Aftermath?, p. 2, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/un/2003/1029charlesworth.pdf. 
120 Preventive self-defence was the essential argument for the attack on Iraq. In addition to that, 
the interventionists tried to give their own interpretation of the Security Council resolutions, 
especially 678/1990, 687/1991 and 1441/2002 claiming that those resolutions provide the 
grounds for  military action. This interpretation is, however, unacceptable, and this was con-
firmed by the Security Council itself. And finally when the first two arguments failed, the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention was used, as was previously mentioned. 
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With all the aforementioned, the doctrine of preventive self-defence does not 
resolve the essence of the problem. The attack on someone else’s territory (for 
instance the rocket attack on the alleged terrorist camps, military facilities etc.) is 
by all means an  act of aggression. Even if we leave that aside, violence does not 
solve anything. Violence breeds violence. Instead of the killed ones, some other 
opponents will come (among others, the terrorists) which will with greater deter-
mination and ruthlessness continue with their predecessor’s cause. 
Lastly, if we were to remain in the domain of the basic practical thinking – 
who can guarantee that the attack, would be undertaken in accordance with this 
doctrine, on the one hand spare the innocent lives (civilians) and still be effi-
cient enough. If the civilians get caught up in the mass sufferings in the so-called 
humanitarian interventions, we should not delude ourselves that they would do 
worse in these «self-defence» actions. On the other hand, even if they appear to 
be efficient, the attack would only slow down the production of the weapons of 
mass destruction, and, after the attack, it would be more difficult to monitor the 
process of production of those weapons and locate the spots where the produc-
tion takes place. Naturally, the destruction caused by the “pre-emptive” strike of 
the USA would cause the increase of animosity towards the USA, which would 
substantially increase the problems that the USA is trying to deal with.121 
 Finally, it is noted for a reason that the fact the USA, on its march to Iraq, 
did not call upon the reasons for a “preventive defence” exclusively, but it tried 
(though in vain) to find some sort of a foothold in the Security Council resolutions, 
witnesses that the USA itself is not certain when it comes to its doctrine.122
In fact, many things point to the fact that the doctrine of preventive self-de-
fence had an infamous failure in practice. It caused tragic consequences firstly for 
the Iraqi people, but for the attackers and the entire international community as 
well. With the increasing number of casualties in the Alliance ranks, the increase 
in the discontent of public opinion is noted in the USA, as well as the decrease in 
the reputation of the USA, and the public manifestation of its diminishing power 
and influence in various part of the world.123  On the other hand, there has been an 
increase in the mutual lack of confidence among superpowers and a huge concern 
of small and medium states. The war in Iraq did not decrease, but on the contrary 
it increased global risk of international terrorism.124 
121 See: Speed R., May M.: Dangerous doctrine, Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/
print.php?art_ofn=ma05speed, pp. 6-7.
122 Currie D.E.J.:  op. cit.,  pp. 5-6; Glennon M.J.: Why the Security Council Failed, Foreign Af-
fairs,  3/2003, pp. 16-35.
123 Kolodziej E.A.: Getting beyond the Bush Doctrine,  Center for Global Studies, University of 
Illinois Occasional Paper 5,  December 2006, pp. 2-3, http://www.cgs.uiuc.edu/resources/oc-
casional_papers/bushdoctrine.pdf. 
124 Long B., Pitts Ch.:  op. cit.,  p. 3.
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IV. CONCLUSION
States that are strong enough, and especially the most powerful ones, can al-
ways resort to force unpunished. And no one can prevent them from doing so. 
Not only because the permanent members of the UN Security Council exonerated 
themselves in advance by the power of veto, but also because of the common fact 
that the enforcement of the collective measures against a power state would mean a 
massive conflict and an almost inevitable overall doom. And nobody wants that. 
However, in this new political reality some states wish to step outside the 
framework created by the international law, and simultaneously create an illusion 
that they are moving within the legal boundaries. In the situation where there is 
no Cold War anymore, which could have explained and justified many things, the 
ways are sought which could, at an opportune time, enable a new manoeuvring 
space by creating several new exceptions to the prohibition of the threat and use 
of force. Being aware of the prohibition of the use of force, the states tend to jus-
tify their actions in a way and avoid being stigmatised as aggressors. 
In that context, the concepts of the (unilateral) humanitarian intervention and 
preventive self-defence seem especially appropriate. This is the case because 
they can be made acceptable in the eyes of an ordinary man, and of the internal 
and external perception by different forms of media and other influences. By 
invoking the principles of humanitarianism and legitimate right to self-defence, 
there is a tendency to ensure sufficient amount of freedom of action What is 
more, there is a tendency to gain consent, affection and recognition for concrete 
undertakings from the rest of the world (humanitarian intervention), i.e. solidarity 
and understanding from the majority of the international community (preventive 
self-defence). 
Such initiatives, however, cannot be accepted particularly because they op-
pose to the basic principles of contemporary international law. These principles 
result from a long-lasting evolution and are not what they are by pure coinci-
dence. In addition to that, these concepts would in fact represent the “asymmetric 
rights” of the superpowers, and used only against small and medium states in 
practice. Common logic suggests that, should the right to a unilateral humanitar-
ian military intervention or the right to “preventive self-defence” be legalised, 
soon nobody would be able to control the situation. 
Actually, many things point to the fact that in this case it is all about using 
small steps to legalise the use of force. Understandably, only in the hands of those 
capable of using it, i.e. of those who are powerful enough.125 
125 Some ten years ago, long before the terrorist attack on 11/9/2001, Madeleine Albright, the USA 
ambassador in the UN at the time, who became the USA Foreign Secretary later on, stated in a 
very straightforward manner that the USA will act  «multilaterally, when we can, and unilater-
ally, when we must.»
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The proclaimed necessity of engagement to make the world a better place for 
living, unfortunately amounts to the actions aimed at adapting that exact world 
to their own views and needs. Two important slogans – on the protection of hu-
man rights and on the fight against terrorism - are actually just pretences used to 
unskilfully disguise the attempt to legalise force. Therefore it is not uncommon 
that in practice the concepts of “humanitarian intervention” and “preventive self-
defence” are usually combined. More and more examples support this, among 
which the most illustrative ones are attacks on Granada and Iraq, already men-
tioned in this paper. 
In reality, however, some ulterior motives are hidden behind it, such as the 
overthrow of the disobedient regime,126 realisation of one’s own strategic and oth-
er interests (access to natural resources, obtaining of military bases etc.). In any 
case, we must agree with those who claim that the rule of non-intervention is es-
sentially connected to the rule that the states have the right to sovereignty and that 
the suggestions to abolish that rule actually intend to abolish the states` right to in-
dependence and construction of the world order on an entirely different basis.127
In case the initiatives at issue managed to impose themselves, it would not only 
represent the throwback to international relations based on plain force (and by that 
to endless wars as well), but it would depict the establishment of such a system of 
international relations which would be under a complete control of the most power-
ful ones, and would rest upon a whole different (new?) international law.
The concept of humanitarian intervention (by this we refer primarily to the 
idea of permissibility of the so-called unilateral interventions) and the doctrine 
of preventive self-defence tend to impose some sort of a review of the rule pro-
hibiting the use of force.128 In other words, there has been an attempt to interpret 
international law in another way, to enrich it with new, but in fact old and obsolete 
institutes.129
However, although the truth remains that things change, even the interna-
tional law, one must agree with those who notice that the reinterpretation of the 
international law must not in any case be the prerogative of a privileged minority 
126 Additional reading: Simpson G.: Velike sile i odmetničke države, Beograd 2006;  Kindzer 
S.: Svrgavanje: pučevi, revolucije i invazije (Kako je Amerika menjala režime, od Havaja do 
Iraka), Beograd 2006; Chomsky N.: Rogue States, Z Magazine, April 1998, 15 pp.,  http://
www.chomsky.info/articles/199804-htm. 
127 Bull H. (ed.):  op. cit., pp. 184-187.
128 For the  moral aspect of this issue, see among others: Coady C.A.J.:  op. cit.; Holzgrefe J.L., 
Keohane R.O. (eds.): Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cam-
bridge University Press 2003; Vuković D.: Moralno pravo na vojnu intervenciju, Sociologija 
1/2000, pp. 69-84.
129 Cfr: Carty A.: The Iraq Invasion as a Recent United Kingdom «Contribution to International 
Law»,  European Journal of International Law 1/2005, pp. 143-151.
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that has the control over the Earth’s resources, but a sovereign right and responsi-
bility of a global community of states and their peoples.130 It should by all means 
develop towards the best interests of the entire international community.
With all that has been said, the attempt to impose new aspects of exceptions 
to the prohibition of the use of force has already manufactured several other ad-
verse consequences. It has become obvious that for this (“humanitarian”) or that 
(“preventive”) reason, virtually every state can be the subject to attack. At the 
same time, the North Korea case demonstrated that the best way to fight constant 
pressures and threats is to develop – nuclear weapons! After the confirmed nu-
clear trial, North Korea suddenly became less exposed to various public attacks, 
pressures and threats. If Saddam had a nuclear arsenal, would he have ended the 
way he did? That is, unfortunately, a guideline to other states to develop their 
own nuclear potentials as soon as possible in order to ensure their own peace. It is 
all, however, leading to a general competition in (nuclear and similar) armament, 
hence towards a drastic increase of the potential conflicts. Just as in the theatre, 
“the rifle hanging on the wall in Act I, fires in the last Act”, the accumulation of 
weapons tends to be used.
Therefore, the attempts to legalise all new exceptions to the prohibition of 
the use of force are not only in collision with the contemporary international law, 
but are also unacceptable because they lead to new conflicts and wars; hence to 
human misfortune and suffering. Who needs it? 
How can we react then to severe human sufferings, i.e. in situations where 
peace and security are at stake? Well, it is understood – through the United Na-
tions! They are created for it.  Until other solutions emerge (for instance, for the 
transformation of the international community into a superstate), reactions can 
only be multilateral – through the Security Council. Even then the solution should 
be sought primarily in the non-military measures, and especially in the collective 
states` actions.131
In that particular case we must agree with the opinion of the Commission 
formed by Kofi Annan, which noticed that the Security Council was sufficiently 
empowered according to section VII of the UN Charter to deal with all security 
challenges; especially with the conclusion that the real tasks are not to find alter-
natives for the Security Council, but to ensure the ever better performance of the 
Council’s role.132
                                                                     (Translated by Ana Mršić)
130 Köchler H.: op. cit., p. 141.
131 See: Murphy S.D.: International Law, the United States, and the Non-military «War» against 
Terrorism,  European Journal of International Law  2/2003, pp. 347-364.
132 A more secure world: Our shared responsibility,  op. cit.,  par. 198, p. 56.
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Sažetak
O koncepcijama humanitarne intervencije i preventivne samoobrane
U novoj političkoj realnosti pojedine države žele iskoračiti izvan okvira koji 
su stvoreni međunarodnim pravom, a da pri tome stvore privid da se kreću u 
granicama prava. U situaciji kada više nema hladnoga rata, kojim se mnogo toga 
moglo  objasniti i opravdati, traže se načini da se, kada se to smatra oportunim, 
omogući novi manevarski prostor, tako što bi se stvorilo nekoliko novih izuzeta-
ka od zabrane uporabe sile i prejetnje silom. Svjesne zabrane uporabe sile, države 
pokušavaju da na neki način opravdaju svoje akcije i da izbjegnu situaciju u kojoj 
mogu biti žigosane kao agresori. 
U tome kontekstu, koncepcije (unilateralne) humanitarne intervencije i pre-
ventivne samoobrane, čine se kao posebno pogodne. Zato što se, naročito raznim 
oblicima medijskoga i drugoga utjecaja, mogu učiniti prihvatljivima u očima 
običnoga čovjeka, a time i domaćega i svjetskoga javnog mnijenja. Pozivanjem 
na načela humanosti i legitimnog prava na samoobranu nastoji se osigurati do-
voljna sloboda akcije. Štoviše, želi se za konkretne pothvate pridobiti suglasnost, 
simpatije, pa i priznanje ostatka svijeta (humanitarna intervencija), odnosno so-
lidarnost i razumijevanje što većega dijela međunarodne zajednice (preventivna 
samoobrana). 
Autor smatra da se takve inicijative ne smiju prihvatiti. Već i zbog toga što su 
u suprotnosti s osnovnim načelima suvremenoga međunarodnoga prava, koja su 
rezultat dugotrajne evolucije i nisu slučajno takvi kakvi su. Uz to, te bi koncepcije 
zapravo predstavljale «asimetrična prava» velikih sila, a u praksi bile uporabljene 
samo protiv malih i srednjih država. Pri tome prosta logika sugerira da, ako bi se 
ozakonilo pravo na unilateralnu humanitarnu oružanu intervenciju, odnosno pra-
vo na «preventivnu samoobranu», ubrzo nitko ne bi mogao nadzirati situaciju. 
Mnogo toga ukazuje da se tu radi o pokušajima da se na mala vrata ozakoni 
uporaba sile. Razumije se, samo u rukama onih koji mogu da je upotrijebe, dakle 
dovoljno moćnih. 
Ako bi se inicijative o kojima je riječ uspjele nametnuti, to ne samo da bi 
predstavljalo povratak na međunarodne odnose zasnovane na goloj sili (a time i 
na beskonačne ratove), već bi značilo uspostavljanje takvog sustava međunarod-
nih odnosa koji bi bio pod punom kontrolom onoga tko je najjači, a počivao bi na 
drugačijem (novome?) međunarodnome pravu.
Pokušaji ozakonjenja novih izuzetaka od zabrane uporabe sile ne samo da 
nisu u skladu sa suvremenim međunarodnim pravom, već su neprihvatljivi i zbog 
toga što vode novim sukobima i ratovima. A to znači i ljudskoj nesreći i patnji. 
Kome to treba? 
Kako onda da se reagira na teška ljudska stradanja, odnosno u situacijama 
kada se procjenjuje da su ugroženi međunarodni mir i sigurnost? Razumije se – 
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preko organizacije Ujedinjenih naroda! Ona je zbog toga i stvorena. Sve dok se 
ne nađu neka druga rješenja (na primjer, nakon prerastanja međunarodne zajed-
nice u neku nad-državu), reakcija može biti samo multilateralna – preko Vijeća 
sigurnosti UN. Čak i tada rješenje treba tražiti prvenstveno u nevojnim mjerama, 
posebice u kolektivnim akcijama država.
Ključne riječi: Uporaba sile, humane intervencije, preventivna samoobrana, pri-
mjenjivo međunarodno pravo, Vijeće sigurnosti Ujedinjenih naroda
